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The Foreign Tax Credit War
Bret Wells*
The government has been involved in a sustained war against
objectionable foreign tax credit transactions. This war has caused the
U.S. foreign tax credit regime to be riddled with complexity that spawns
incoherent outcomes. The complexity contained in section 901 was
created due to a legitimate concern: the threats posed by objectionable
transactions that artificially generate excess foreign tax credits
represent real policy problems. Since at least 1975, Congress and the
Treasury Department have been convinced that the cross-crediting of
excess foreign tax credits arising from “objectionable transactions”
required a response in addition to simply relying on section 904. Thus, it
is understandable that Congress and the Treasury Department would
seek to redefine the foreign tax credit eligibility standards in response to
transactions that generate foreign tax credits in objectionable ways.
However, the historical record indicates that Congress and the Treasury
Department ran roughshod over section 901 and used a scorched earth
approach in their war against objectionable foreign tax credit
transactions. The result is that the U.S. foreign tax credit regime is a
“byzantine structure of staggering complexity.”1 In the rush to enact
reforms, ill-conceived provisions were enacted that should not have
been enacted.
Objectionable foreign tax credit transactions needed principled
responses, and principled responses were enacted in the midst of a
scattergun attack on these objectionable transactions. However, the
United States must have a principled foreign tax credit regime that
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balances the need to prevent international double income taxation with
the need to prevent abusive transactions. This Article addresses the
disallowance provisions that have been added to section 901 as part of
the government’s war against objectionable foreign tax credit
transactions and assesses which of those provisions serve a continuing
policy objective and which do not. This Article argues that U.S. tax law
would be greatly improved if section 901 embodied a principled
approach and if redundant provisions that create incoherent outcomes
were removed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The government has waged a sustained war against objectionable
foreign tax credit transactions. 2 The impacts of these hostilities have
caused the U.S. foreign tax credit regime to be riddled with
enormous complexity. It is now time to take a step back and
reconsider the fundamental interest that a foreign tax credit regime
seeks to promote and the fundamental interest that the U.S.
government has in preventing cross-crediting of excess foreign tax
credits generated from objectionable transactions. This inquiry is
needed so that the U.S. foreign tax credit regime can be made
more coherent.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the U.S. foreign
tax credit regime has grown in importance due to the policy choices
of other developed nations. In the formative debates about
international tax policy, tax scholars predicted that all nations would
adopt worldwide income tax regimes as they moved from semideveloped status to developed nation status. 3 But, in fact, the world
has moved in the opposite direction, with most of the major U.S.
trading partners adopting territorial tax regimes. 4 A territorial tax
regime does not impose meaningful taxation over extra-territorial
profits, and so international double income taxation is structurally
avoided with such a regime. 5 Consequently, the continued adherence
by the United States to a worldwide income tax regime represents an
increasingly divergent tax system with important implications for the

2. The term “foreign tax credit generator” is of recent vintage. See I.R. 2007-73, IRS
Issues Regulations on Transactions Designed to Artificially Generate Foreign Tax Credits
(Mar. 29, 2007) (using the term “foreign tax credit generator transactions”) But, as will be
demonstrated in this Article, the policy motivations that engender hostility to artificial
generation of foreign tax credits has represented a significant force in the evolution of existing
law for at least forty years.
3. League of Nations Econ. & Fiscal Comm., Report on Double Taxation to the
Financial Committee of the League of Nations, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73 F. 19 at
51 (1923).
4. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 112th Cong., BACKGROUND
AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS
THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME, JCX-33-11 (2011) (analyzing nine major U.S.
trading partners that provide for an exemption system); see also Staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation, Present Law and Issues in U.S. Taxation of Cross-Border Income, JCX-42-11
(2011) (reviewing policy considerations between a territorial and worldwide tax system).
5. See supra note 4.

1897

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

U.S. foreign tax credit regime. Multinational enterprises located in
territorial tax regimes have no meaningful risk of international
double income taxation. In contrast, U.S. multinational enterprises
must rely on a coherently functioning U.S. foreign tax credit regime
to avoid international double income taxation. 6 Respected scholars
have forcefully argued that worldwide taxation of resident
multinational enterprises is the best policy choice for our country, 7

6. Professor Kingson succinctly made this point in 1981 as follows:
The United States uses the credit method, under which a residence country taxes
foreign income but reduces its tax by taxes paid to the source country. . . . On the
other hand, continental European countries generally use the exemption method,
which exempts from corporate tax dividends or branch profits in respect of direct
investment abroad. In that case, regardless of the source country tax rate, the
residence country has no revenue interst in the investment. By reason of that
difference, the residence conflict [with source country taxation] for Germany and
other exemption method countries is not complicated, as it is in the
United States . . . .
Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1164–
65 (1981).
7. See e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen Shay, Formulary
Apportionment in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2014); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen Shay,
Designing a U.S. Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX
REV. 397, 406–12 (2012); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Understanding Consolidated Returns, 12
FLA. TAX REV. 125, 182 (2012); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Consolidating Foreign Subsidiaries,
11 FLA L. REV. 143, 195–96 (2011); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen Shay,
Reinvegiorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimensions, 27 Va. Tax Rev.
437, 528–61 (2008); Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Reform and
Simplification of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules, 31 TAX NOTES INT’L 1177, 1207 (2003);
Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing
Deferral of US Tax On Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 458 (1999); Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral as We Know It: Simplification Potential of Check- the-Box, 74 TAX
NOTES 219, 224 (1997); Asim Bhansali, Globalizing Consolidated Taxation of United States
Multinationals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1422 (1996); Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of
International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, 47 TAX NOTES 581 (1990); Jane G.
Gravelle, Foreign Tax Provisions of the American Jobs Act of 1996, 72 TAX NOTES 1165 (1996);
Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational
Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 75 (1993); John McDonald, Comment, Anti-Deferral
Deferred: A Proposal for the Reform of International Tax Law, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 248,
281 (1995); Peter Merrill & Carol Dunahoo, ‘Runaway Plant’ Legislation: Rhetoric and
Reality, 72 TAX NOTES 221, 221 (1996); Stephen E. Shay, Revisiting U.S. Anti-Deferral
Rules, 74 TAXES 1042, 1061 (1996); Joseph Isenbergh, Perspectives on the Deferral of U.S.
Taxation of the Earnings of Foreign Corporations, 66 TAXES 1062, 1063 (1988); Lee Sheppard,
Last Corporate Taxpayer Out the Door, Please Turn Out the Lights, 82 TAX NOTES 941,
944 (1999).
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and this discussion has generated a spirited rebuttal by other
respected scholars. 8
Instead of joining that larger debate, this Article assumes that the
United States will continue to assert residency-based worldwide
taxation (either on a current or deferred basis) on the foreign
income of U.S. multinational enterprises. In this context, what
should the U.S. foreign tax credit regime look like? Even though this
Article assumes that residency-based worldwide taxation remains a
fixture of U.S. international tax policy for the foreseeable future, the
fact that most other countries have opted for a territorial tax regime
provides an important backdrop for evaluating the U.S. foreign tax
credit regime. Said differently, now that the major trading partners
of the United States do not assert meaningful extra-territorial
taxation over active foreign business income, the United States
simply must have a “coherent” 9 U.S. foreign tax credit regime that
does not create unnecessary instances of international double income
taxation. 10 But when is international double income taxation

8. Mihir A. Desai, C. Gritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr., Domestic Effects of the Foreign
Activities of U.S. Multinationals, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POLICY 181, 201 (2009); Mihir A.
Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global
Setting, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 937 (2004); James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax
Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003); James R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A
Deferential Reconsideration, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 385, 401–02 (1999); Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, Inc., The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century:
Part One: A Reconsideration of Subpart F, 1999 TNT 58-17, [9], [57], Doc. 1999-11623
(1999); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Competition & Competitiveness: Review of NFTC Subpart F
Report, 83 TAX NOTES 582, 582 (1999); Peter R. Merrill, A Response to Professor Avi-Yonah
on Subpart F, 83 TAX NOTES 1802, 1802 (1999).
9. See Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1153 (1981) (“Coherence means, then, that each country must take into account how
the others tax international income. . . . [O]ne tax system can take advantage of another; and
other countries are taking that advantage of the United States. Their overtaxation limits our
revenues; their undertaxation mocks our treaties; and their discrimination, by both law and
unequal tax administration, blunts our competitiveness. Unfortunately, the responsibility does
not rest entirely abroad. Precisely because tax systems do interact, United States tax decisions
have helped create the current situation.”).
10. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99th Cong., General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 at 861 (Comm. Print 1986) (“The purpose of the foreign tax credit is to
reduce international double taxation.”). But, even though the majority view has been clear
about the need for and purpose of the U.S. foreign tax credit, there has been an ongoing
debate since at least 1934 about whether the allowance of a tax credit is necessary as the
following representative excerpt so indicates:
Under the Revenue Acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917 a taxpayer was not entitled to
any credit for taxes paid to a foreign country. These early acts permitted taxes paid
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“necessary” and when is it “inappropriate?” Greater focus and
urgency should be brought to bear on this question because the
United States must have a coherent foreign tax credit regime given
the policy choices of other nations.
The original intent of the U.S. foreign tax credit regime is not
hard to understand. In order to mitigate against the perceived evils
of international double income taxation, section 901(b)(1) has
existed since 1918 11 and provides U.S. foreign tax credit relief for
any income and excess profits12 taxes paid or accrued to a foreign

to a foreign country to be deducted only from gross income, which was also the rule
applied in the case of State, county, and municipal taxes.
Our subcommittee recommended the elimination of the foreign tax credit and a
return to the deduction system permitted under the early revenue acts, which
system, of course, returns substantially greater revenue than the present method.
The Treasury Department, however, was of the opinion that the present method
was fair and should be continued, pointing out that “the United States, to avoid
burdensome double taxation and to encourage foreign trade, should therefore allow
an offsetting credit against its own income tax.”
See J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS at 373
(1938). Regardless of its origin, the allowance of a foreign tax credit in lieu of a deduction
continues to be debated by scholars to this day. Compare Daniel N. Shaviro, The Case Against
Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 65 (2011); Kimberly Clausing and Daniel N.
Shaviro, A Burden-Neutral Shift from Foreign Tax Creditability to Deductibility?, 64 TAX L.
REV. 431 (2011), with Reuven Avi-Yonah, No Country is an Island: Is a Radical Rethinking of
International Taxation Needed?, UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH., U of Michigan Public Law
Research Paper No. 380 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2389979. Notwithstanding this academic debate, no serious legislative effort has occurred
since 1934 to change the creditability of foreign income taxes, thus making the desire to avoid
double international income taxation one of the longest and most fundamental aspects of the
U.S. international tax regime.
11. See REVENUE ACT OF 1918, PUB. L. 65-254, §222(A), 40 STAT. 1057, 1073 (as
codified in I.R.C. §901(b)). Initially, the U.S. provided no foreign tax credit relief under the
income tax laws of 1909 and 1913. See generally REVENUE ACT OF 1909, CH. 6, 36 STAT. 11;
REVENUE ACT OF 1913, CH. 16, 38 STAT. 114, at 172. But, the income tax rates were
admittedly small, so the cost of not providing U.S. foreign tax credit relief at that time was not
significant. However, with the advent of World War I, tax rates increased sharply in the U.S.
and other countries. Stanley S. Surrey, The United States Taxation of Foreign Income, 1 J.L. &
ECON. 72, 73 n.3 (1959). With increasing tax rates in both foreign countries and the United
States, the cost of international double taxation became a significant cost to U.S. taxpayers. Id.
at 73. As a result, in 1918, Congress adopted a foreign tax credit regime. The creation of a
broad-based foreign tax credit was principally the invention of Thomas S. Adams, an economic
advisor to the Treasury Department at the time. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear,
The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1038–39
n.71 (1997).
12. Excess profits taxes were imposed on only a portion of total income in excess of a
given rate of return. See W.G. McAdoo, Treasury Secretary, Income, Excess Profits, and Estate
Taxes: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means 15 (1918) (“By an excess-profits
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country. As one of the longest-held U.S. international tax principles,
Congress and the judiciary have recognized for almost a century that
a robust U.S. foreign tax credit regime is an important feature of
U.S. tax law whose fundamental purpose is to prevent international
double income taxation. 13 In deciding which foreign taxes represent
income and excess profits taxes eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit
relief, the Supreme Court in Biddle 14 established that this inquiry
would be made using U.S. principles. 15 In working out these U.S.

tax we mean a tax upon profits in excess of a given return upon capital.”); see also GEORGE E.
HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX, WAR-PROFITS AND EXCESS-PROFITS TAXES 14, 136 (1920)
(stating excess profits taxes were imposed on only a portion of total income). The statute also
refers to “war profits taxes.” For an historical definition of a war profits tax, see W.G. McAdoo,
Treasury Secretary, Income, Excess Profits, and Estate Taxes: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means 15 (1918) (“By a war-profits tax we mean a tax upon profits in excess of
those realized before the war.”). By World War II, war-profits taxes were viewed as simply a
subcategory of excess profits taxes. See KENNETH JAMES CURRAN, EXCESS PROFITS TAXATION
at 2 (AM. COUNCIL ON PUB. AFFS. 1943) (“[T]he term ‘excess profits tax’ [today is used] to
describe any levy that is confined to a segment of a taxpayer’s income that is considered
excessive, no matter by what standard of measurement it is determined.”). Thus, for clarity to
the modern reader, this paper discusses income taxes and excess profits taxes.
13. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 7 (1932) (the foreign tax credit is
designed “to mitigate the evil of double taxation”); Am. Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U.S.
450, 452 (1942) (“the purpose [of the foreign tax credit] is to avoid double taxation”);
United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 493 U.S. 132, 139 (1989) (“The [legislative]
history of the indirect credit clearly demonstrates that the credit was intended to protect a
domestic parent from double taxation of its income.”); Comm’r v. Am. Metal Co., 221 F.2d
134, 137 (2d Cir. 1955) (“The primary objective of [the foreign tax credit regime] is to
prevent double taxation and a secondary objective is to encourage American foreign trade.”).
The legislative history is consistent and longstanding. See H. REP. 1337, 83RD CONG., 2D SESS.
at 76 (1954) (“The [foreign tax credit] provision was originally designed to produce
uniformity of tax burden among United States taxpayers, irrespective of whether they were
engaged in business in the United States or engaged in business abroad.”); S. REP. NO. 558,
73RD CONG 2D SESS. at 39 (1934) (“The present [foreign tax] credit . . . does relieve the
taxpayer from a double tax upon his foreign income.”); H.R. REP. 767, 65TH CONG., 2D SESS.
(1918), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 86, 93 (in explaining the rationale for a foreign tax credit, the
legislative history stated as follows: “[w]ith the corresponding high rates imposed by certain
foreign countries that taxes levied in such countries in addition to the taxes levied in the
United States upon citizens of the United States place a very sever burden upon
such citizens”).
14. Biddle v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 573, 579 (1938); see also United States v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132, 145 (1989) (reaffirming the approach contained
in Biddle).
15. Although Biddle dealt with whether U.S. or foreign law should be used to
determine the identity of the technical taxpayer of the foreign tax, subsequent cases used the
Supreme Court’s statement that U.S. law, not foreign law, should broadly be used for purposes
of applying the U.S. foreign tax credit rules including with respect to the question of whether
a foreign levy was an income tax. See Comm’r v. Am. Metal Co., 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1955).
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principles, 16 early cases and IRS rulings held that taxes levied on
“imputed income” could be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief
if net income was attempted to be taxed and was so taxed. 17 In
general, these early cases and IRS rulings took an expansive view of
credit eligibility, allowing the foreign country considerable latitude
to define the manner in which a formulary tax arrived at the net
income it intended to tax. 18 Thus, although the diversity of foreign
taxes made the pre-1983 case law inconsistent at the outer edges, the
substantive law was based on a principle-based approach: if the
foreign tax was designed to tax net income and predominantly did
tax net income in practice, then U.S. foreign tax credit relief was
appropriate in
order to prevent international double
income taxation. 19
Yet, a basic tension exists within the foreign tax credit regime,
and the outworking of this basic tension has created increasing
complexity and risks of international double income taxation. The
basic tension at the core of the US foreign tax credit regime relates
to the question of how the U.S. government should address the
problem of cross-crediting excess foreign tax credits generated in
objectionable transactions. In the cross-crediting fact pattern, the
central question is whether one should think about prevention of
international double income taxation narrowly (i.e., on only that

16. Some have called for a broader allowance of creditability of taxes beyond foreign
income taxes. See Joseph Isenbergh, The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable
Taxes, 39 TAX L. REV. 227, 230–31 (1984).
17. See Burke Bros. v. Comm’r, 20 B.T.A. 1657 (1930) (Indian tax on goat skins was
calculated based on the difference between the average sales price of goat skins in their
destination from the average sales price in Calcutta and reduced by certain transportation
expenses; held, the presumptive tax was an income tax entitled to U.S. foreign tax credit
relief);Keen v. Comm’r, 15 B.T.A. 1243 (1929) (a tax on presumed income was calculated on
nondomiciled persons who maintained a residence in France; income was presumed to be a
minimum of seven times the rental value of their residence; held, French tax was an income tax
eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief); Hatmaker v. Comm’r, 15 B.T.A. 1044 (1929)
(same); Rev. Rul. 53-272, 193-2 C.B. 56 (a Haitian tax was imposed on business income
computed by multiplying the rental value of the land and buildings by five and assessing an
income tax on this imputed income; IRS held this was an attempt to tax presumed income and
was eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief); Rev. Rul. 56-658, 1956-2 C.B. 501 (Cuban tax
on sugar mill operators assessed based on the amount of sugar produced times the average
price for sugar and reduced by 60% for “deemed expenses” held that this presumptive tax was
creditable as an attempt to tax income).
18. See ELISABETH OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT: A STUDY OF THE CREDIT FOR
FOREIGN TAXES UNDER UNITED STATES INCOME TAX LAW 43–46 (1961).
19. Id. at 33–46.
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particular item-of-income and its attributable foreign taxes on a
stand-alone basis without cross-crediting excess taxes), or whether
mitigation of international double income taxation should be
evaluated on an overall basis (i.e., by aggregating foreign income and
foreign taxes in some fashion). Congress and the Treasury
Department have provided multiple responses to the cross-crediting
phenomenon, and this multiplicity of responses has created
considerable complexity.
As one longstanding answer to the central question posed by the
cross-crediting phenomenon, Congress has formulated aggregate
foreign tax credit limitation rules to regulate the scope and extent of
cross-crediting of excess foreign tax credits since 1921. 20 Although
these section 904 foreign tax credit limitation rules have changed in
important ways over time, 21 the overall and separate limitation

20. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 at 862 (Comm. Print 1986) (“Congress recognized that, in certain
situations, cross-crediting should not be permitted when it would distort the purpose of the
foreign tax credit limitation. Congress believed that, in some cases, the ability of U.S. persons
to average foreign tax rates for foreign tax credit limitation purposes and thereby reduce or
eliminate the residual U.S. tax on their foreign income had undesirable consequences.”).
21. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND
ANALYSIS OF PRESENT-LAW RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SCHEDULED
FOR A HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS at II.A.5.c, JCX-40-99
(June 28, 1999). Between 1918 and 1921, there were no limitations on the use of foreign tax
credits. See id. at II.A.5.c, IV.B.2 (1999). As a result, taxpayers could utilize foreign tax credits
to fully reduce their residual U.S. tax liability on both domestic source income and foreign
source income. See id. at II.A.5.b, IV.B.2 (1999). However, in order to protect the U.S. tax
jurisdiction’s right to tax U.S. source income, Congress in 1921 enacted an overall foreign tax
credit limitation that limited the usage of foreign tax credits to the U.S. taxpayer’s U.S. tax
liability on net foreign source income. See REVENUE ACT OF 1921, CH. 136, § 222(A)(5),
238(A), 904(A), 42 STAT. 227, 249, 258. Although not further discussed in this article, this
limitation regime has taken various forms. In 1932, Congress decreed that taxpayers were
required to use the lesser of an overall or per-country limitation. See Revenue Act of 1932, CH.
209, § 131(B), 47 STAT. 169, 211. In 1954, the overall limitation was repealed and only the
per-country limitation regime existed. See I.R.C. §904 (2006). In 1960, taxpayers were given
the option to use either a per-country or an overall limitation computation. See Act of Sept.
14, 1960, CH. PUB. L. NO. 86-780, § 1(A), 74 STAT. 1010. In 1976, the per-country limitation
was repealed, and the law had come full circle to the position of 1921. See Tax Reform Act of
1976, CH. PUB. L. NO. 94-455, § 1031, § 904, 90 STAT. 1610, 1620–24. In 1986, the foreign
tax credit basket rules were instituted along with an overall limitation regime to form the basis
of current law. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, CH. PUB. L. NO. 99-514, § 1201, § 904(d), 100
STAT. 2085, 2520-28. Effective for years beginning in 2006, the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004 reduced the number of foreign tax credit baskets down to two baskets: the “passive
basket” and the “general basket.” See American Jobs Creation Act, PUB. L. NO. 108-357, 118
STAT. 1418 (2004).
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regimes of section 904(a) and section 904(d) can be summarized as
follows: the U.S. foreign tax credit regime is intended to prevent
international double income taxation on an aggregate basis except to
the extent necessary to protect the U.S. taxing jurisdiction on U.S.
domestic source income and to protect against inappropriate crosscrediting of taxes against low-taxed passive basket foreign
source income. 22
Since at least 1975, 23 Congress has believed that section 904 is
not a sufficient response in and of itself against perceived
manipulation of the amount of allowable U.S. foreign tax credits
generated in objectionable transactions. Thus, although section 904
expresses an overall or aggregate approach to the cross-crediting
phenomenon, Congress has simultaneously pursued a parallel effort
to outright disallow foreign tax credit relief for taxes generated in
specific transactions where the amount of U.S. foreign tax credits
generated in such transactions was perceived to be unreasonable.
The ravages of this war have left their mark, causing the U.S. foreign
tax credit regime to be described as “a byzantine structure of
staggering complexity.” 24
The war against objectionable foreign tax credit transactions that
generate artificially high amounts of U.S. foreign tax credits reached
an important milestone in 2010 when Congress codified the
economic substance doctrine in section 7701(o). 25 Section 7701(o)
22. I.R.C. § 904(a), (d) (2010).
23. In the author’s view, war was declared with the enactment of I.R.C. § 907, and we
have been witnessing continuing hostilities since then as the war shifts to other terrain, but the
basic policy concern with abusive cross-crediting remains the central feature that has caused the
law to evolve.
24. BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 15.21[1][a] (7th ed. Supp. 2014); see also Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Reform and Simplification of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit
Rules, 31 TAX NOTES INT’L 1177, 1200 (2003). To be faithful to this complexity, the author
has sought to provide robust footnotes for the authorities that provide illumination for the
tortured history that has led to the current complexity, but consistent with the thesis of this
Article, the main text has sought to provide a straightforward articulation of the fundamental
principles that should shape I.R.C. § 901 in the future.
25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, PUB. L. NO. 111-148, §
1409(a). Codification of the economic substance doctrine was driven by a concern over tax
shelters generally and not simply international foreign tax credit arbitrage transactions. See
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL PART TWO:
BUSINESS TAX PROVISIONS, at 36 (2009). However, even though section 7701(o) was
intended as a broader anti-abuse provision, it was intended to also address foreign tax credit
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codifies a broad anti-abuse rule that applies throughout the U.S.
income tax laws. 26 Importantly, section 7701(o) makes clear that a
taxpayer must have a substantial business purpose in order to claim
tax benefits, including tax benefits arising from foreign tax credits.
Furthermore, instead of providing a safe-harbor profit threshold,
section 7701(o)(2)(A) requires that a transaction’s expected nontax
profit potential must be substantial in comparison to its expected tax
benefits in order for the taxpayer’s profit motive to constitute a
substantial business purpose. Section 7701(o)(5)(D) allows the
economic substance doctrine to be applied to a single transaction or
to a series of transactions, thus clarifying that the government has the
ability to disaggregate transactions and test the business purpose of
each transaction step individually. 27 Section 7701(o)(2)(B) requires
the Treasury Department to issue regulations (which as of yet it has
not done) 28 to treat foreign taxes as an expense for purposes of

generator transactions and thus represents another bulwark that potentially impacts the
taxpayer’s eligibility to claim foreign tax credit relief in a meaningful way. See STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT”, at 152–53 (2010).
26. A discussion of the codification of the economic substance doctrine outside of its
impact in the foreign tax credit arena is beyond the scope of this Article and has received
significant scholarly attention elsewhere. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Reframing Economic
Substance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 271 (2011); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Living With the Codified
Economic Substance Doctrine, 128 TAX NOTES 731 (Aug. 16, 2010); Bret Wells, Economic
Substance Doctrine: How Codification Changes Decided Cases, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 411 (2010).
27. The legislative history states that this provision “does not alter the court’s ability to
aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise recharacterize a transaction when applying the doctrine,”
thus by implication suggesting that a court should exercise this authority. See STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT”, at 153 (2010). For cases
that favorably allowed a bifurcation approach, see generally ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d
231, 256 n. 48 (3d Cir. 1998); James v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 905, 910 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The
only transactions at issue in this case are the purported sales by the Communications Group to
the joint ventures. These sales cannot be legitimized merely because they were on the
periphery of some legitimate transactions.”); Karr v. Comm’r, 924 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir.
1991) (“The activities of the other entities involved in exploiting the Koppelman process,
however, cannot necessarily be attributed to POGA [the taxpayer].”); Long Term Capital
Holdings v. United States 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x 40 (2d
Cir. 2005).
28. In Notice 2010-65, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411, the IRS indicated its intention to issue
implementing regulations but that “[i]n the interim, the enactment of the provision does not
restrict the ability of the courts to consider the appropriate treatment of foreign taxes in
economic substance cases.”
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calculating the reasonably expected pre-tax profit potential of a
transaction. Section 7701(o) is a principled approach for regulating
the abusive generation of excess foreign tax credits.
Unfortunately, prior to the enactment of section 7701(o), the
Treasury Department and Congress adopted a number of ad hoc
responses that were designed to attack objectionable foreign tax
credit transactions, 29 and the result is that inferior and redundant
disallowance provisions still clutter section 901. The added
complexity of these obsolete anti-abuse bulwarks add a hodge-podge
of substantive requirements that needlessly creates a risk of
international double income taxation in nonobjectionable situations.
It is time to repeal these obsolete provisions because incoherent
foreign tax credit outcomes should not be tolerated when more
targeted and more principled solutions already adequately address
these objectionable foreign tax credit transactions. 30
In the following Section, this Article addresses the pre-section
7701(o) effort to disallow foreign tax credit relief for taxes generated
in objectionable transactions and evaluates which of these
predecessor provisions serve a continuing purpose and which do not.
Although the law in this area is nuanced, complex, and at times
incoherent, the thesis of this Article is straightforward: U.S. tax law
would be greatly improved if section 901 embodied a principled
approach and if obsolete and incoherent aspects of section 901 were
removed. Furthermore, where the foreign tax credit disallowance

29. The synthesis of the evolution of the law in the U.S. foreign tax credit regime and
its ad hoc nature is more fully discussed and explored in Part II, infra.
30. The following testimony is particularly relevant:
[T]he foreign tax credit rules have been repeatedly revised and have become
exceedingly complex. The sources of complexity are varied, but their common
denominator in my view can best be described as the continual pursuit of technical
perfection. Trying to make sure that the rules operate as intended is of course a
worthy goal for any set of tax rules, but in the case of the foreign tax credit, it has
led over time to a system that makes comprehensive compliance and administration
nearly impossible. . . . Changes to the foreign tax credit rules, from ad hoc tweaks to
wholesale revision, make long-term business planning difficult for U.S. businesses,
relative to their foreign competitors. The complexity and instability of the U.S.
foreign tax credit rules impose a material, ongoing administrative burden on
taxpayers and the government.
Statement of Dirk J. J. Suringa Before the House Committee on Ways & Means on the Need
for Comprehensive Tax Reform to Help American Companies Compete in the Global Market
and Create Jobs for American Workers (May 12, 2011), available at 2011 WTD 93-35, Tax
Doc. 2011-10286.
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provisions create an unnecessary risk of international double income
taxation for U.S. multinational enterprises in situations where a U.S.
taxpayer’s foreign income has borne foreign income taxes in
nonobjectionable transactions, a double tax outcome represents an
“incoherent outcome.” Such an outcome should not be tolerated
given that needless instances of international double income taxation
are out-of-step with the policy decisions of the major trading
partners of the United States. As the United States becomes more
and more isolated in its worldwide residency-based taxation of U.S.
multinational enterprises, it simply must have a well-functioning U.S.
foreign tax credit regime that achieves coherent outcomes. If section
901 is to fulfill its fundamental purpose, foreign tax credit relief
should be available except where disallowance of such relief is
necessary to quash objectionable foreign tax credit transactions. In
Part II, this Article evaluates reasons that justified the added
complexity in the foreign tax credit regime and why several of those
reforms are no longer needed. Part III sets forth a synthesis of how
Congress should proceed in light of the knowledge derived from the
content of Part II.
II. THE KEY EPISODES IN THE FORTY YEARS’ WAR
A. Desert Storm and the Oil Royalty Problem
1. Overkill occasioned by the dual capacity problem
The government declared war on objectionable transactions that
inflated the amount of allowable U.S. foreign tax credits on March
29, 1975, 31 and the original fight was over oil—or more specifically
over the creditability of the high extraction taxes imposed on dual
capacity taxpayers in the natural resources extraction industry.
During the 1960s and 1970s, foreign oil-producing governments
(presumably in consultation with U.S. oil and gas producers)
decided to forego charging higher royalties for the development of
state-owned mineral interests and instead adopted special tax levies
that had the effect of inflating the amount of U.S. foreign
tax credits. 32

31. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, §601, 89 Stat 26.
32. See Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386 (Saudi Arabia imposed a surtax equal to a
percentage of the posted price per barrel of oil was held to be a creditable income tax); Rev.
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Congress realized that high extraction taxes could include
disguised oil royalties and was concerned that allowing the crosscrediting of these high extraction taxes would lead to “artificial” and
“excessive” amounts of U.S. foreign tax credit relief. 33 Consequently,
in 1975 Congress decided to create a new foreign tax credit
limitation for extraction taxes by enacting section 907. 34 In 1982,
Congress modified section 907 to ensure that the maximum amount
of creditable taxes for foreign oil and gas extraction income would
not exceed the maximum U.S. tax rate. 35 Thus, Congress’ response
Rul. 68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306 (a surtax imposed by Libya based on a posted price per barrel
on holders of petroleum concessions was held to be a creditable income tax). These two ruling
were revoked by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 78-63, 1978-1 C.B. 228. For a discussion of this oil
versus royalty problem and the artificial inflation of foreign tax credit benefits that provided
the rationale for enacting section 907, see, for example, Hearings on Foreign Tax Credits
Claimed by U.S. Petroleum Companies before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations,
95th Cong. 2 (1977) (opening statement of Benjamin Rosenthal, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Gov’t Operations); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1502, at 61 (1974); Hearings on “Windfall” Excess
Profits Tax Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93rd Cong. 151 (1974) (testimony of
Treasury Secretary Shultz). A report by the United States General Accounting Office asserted
that Rev. Rul. 55-296 “assumed the nature of a foreign aid program in the 1950s with the
knowledge and consent of the U.S. government.” COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFF., EMD-80-86, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT AND U.S. ENERGY POLICY 40
(1980). Professor Kingson, citing this report, asserted that providing foreign tax credits for
what amounted to disguised royalties was done “in order to help that country at a time when
direct aid was practically impossible” and later on other countries affirmatively exploited this
technique to the detriment of the U.S. federal budget. Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of
International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1153, 1265–67.
33. H.R. 91-413, 91st CONG. 89, 107, 110 (1969) (“Your committee recognizes the
substantial difficulties of ascertaining in these situations whether a payment which is labeled as
a tax payment is, in fact, a tax or a royalty. It does not believe, however, that it is appropriate to
allow these “tax payments” to offset U.S. tax which would otherwise be imposed on other
foreign income (either from the same country or from another country.”). See also the
following statement of Senator Long, which is illustrative of the Congressional attitude at
that time:
The [Saudi Arabian] king collected a royalty and he levied a tax on the companies.
The companies concluded that they could only deduct their royalty but they were
entitled to a tax credit if they were paying a tax. Therefore, some tax expert—and
anybody with any brains as a tax expert would figure this one out—simply said “If
Saudi Arabia were charging you the same amount as a tax, you would get a credit for
it, which would be worth twice what a deduction would be worth. So why do you not
tell the King over there that if he would assess that payment as a tax, you could afford
to pay him a lot more, and you both would be better off, because you would owe the
U.S. Government less?”
121 CONG. REC. 7490 (1975) (statement by Sen. Long).
34. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 601, 89 Stat. 26.
35. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 211, 96
Stat. 324.
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to the disguised oil royalty problem posed by high extraction taxes
was to isolate royalties into their own separate foreign tax credit
limitation in order to prevent the cross-crediting of these taxes
against any non-extraction income. 36 In 2006, Congress simplified
the various foreign tax credit limitation baskets 37 in section 904(d) to
provide for a general basket and a passive basket. 38
However, notwithstanding those simplification reforms that
apply across all industries, section 907 remained unchanged.
Consequently, the petroleum industry remained singled out for a
specialized foreign tax credit limitation while all other industries
benefitted from simplification. 39 In 2008, Congress combined
foreign oil and gas extraction income and foreign oil-related income
into a new combined category called “foreign oil and gas income”
and applied the section 907 limitations on this new combined
category. 40 The continued existence of the section 907 limitation
regime would make sense if the specter of the historic disguised oil
royalty problem were still present, but the reality is that this problem
has already been addressed through the more targeted provisions set
forth in Regulation section 1.901-2A, yet section 907 remains.
Thus, seen in this historical context, singling out the extraction
industry for specialized treatment is unnecessary once the disguised
oil royalty problem has been addressed via other means and the
remaining creditable amounts are otherwise nonobjectionable.
To understand why section 907 no longer serves a vital policy
goal, the regulatory changes to section 901 that redundantly

36. The nuances of the limitation rules of section 907 and how they apply to the
interplay between “foreign oil and gas extraction income” and “foreign oil related income” are
adequately addressed elsewhere. See Heather Crowder & Caren Shein, Energy Improvement
and Extension Act of 2008—Throwing a Rope to the Ailing Financial Industry Tightens the
Noose on Big Oil, 38 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 85 (2009); Javed A. Khokar, TEFRA Enacts Stricter
Rules to Govern Taxation of Foreign Oil and Gas Income, 83 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 85 (1983).
37. I.R.C. §§ 904(a), (d).
38. This Article does not seek to reconsider these section 904 reforms for simplifying
the limitations on the aggregate cross-crediting of foreign tax credits other than to say that
Congress has provided only two aggregate baskets for managing the potential cross-crediting
of taxes arising from nonobjectionable transactions and to say that section 904 is the
appropriate place to handle cross-crediting for nonobjectionable foreign taxes.
39. See Crowder & Shein, supra note 36, at 97.
40. See PUB. L. NO. 110-343, DIV. B, § 402 (2008). Thus, although high extraction
taxes no longer are limited to solely foreign oil and gas extraction income, they still cannot be
cross-credited against non-oil and gas income such as income arising from the chemical
processing businesses of integrated companies.
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attacked the disguised oil royalty problem must be understood. Even
though Congress enacted section 907 to attack the disguised oil
royalty problem, 41 the Treasury Department decided to join the fray
by attacking the same problem using its regulatory authority under
section 901. It was understood at the time the Treasury Department
commenced its amendment of its section 901 regulations 42 in order
to redundantly attack the disguised oil royalty problem. 43 At the
41. K. Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit Regulations as They Affect Petroleum Income—Post
Mortem and Analysis, 83 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 1, 3–6 (1983).
42. On November 17, 1980, the Treasury Department issued temporary regulations
that articulated formal criteria that a foreign tax would be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit
relief if and only if the foreign tax was equivalent to an income tax in the United States sense,
and for this test to be met the foreign tax must meet three formalistic tests (the gross receipts
test, the realization test, and the net income test). T.D. 7739, Treas. Reg. § 4.901-2(c), 45
Fed. Reg. 75,647 (Nov. 17, 1980). For an analysis of these temporary regulations and their
impact on prior law, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 256, 285 (1995). The
effect of the 1980 regulations was that a levy paid by a petroleum company to a mineralowning foreign government could be denied in its entirety if the effective tax rate for
petroleum taxpayers were significantly higher than those imposed on nonpetroleum taxpayers.
T.D. 7739, Treas. Reg. § 4.901-2(d), 45 Fed. Reg. 75,647 (Nov. 17, 1980). Prior case law
had determined that foreign taxes represented income tax if they were “substantial[ly]
equivalent” in nature to the US income tax regime. See, e.g., New York & Honduras Rosario
Mining Co. v. Comm’r, 168 F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir. 1948), rev’g. and remanding 8 T.C. 1232
(1947). However, on April 5, 1983, the Treasury Department stated that a foreign levy would
be eligible for US foreign tax credit relief if an only if the “predominant character” of the
foreign levy was that of an income tax in the US sense, and these final regulations left the
underlying formalistic three-pronged test for creditability essentially unchanged. Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,641 (Apr. 5, 1983); Kevin D. Dolan, General
Standards of Creditability Under §§ 901 and 903 Final Regulations—New Words, Old Concepts,
13 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 167, 168 (1984) (stating that “one can only guess whether there is
any difference between those general standards [predominant character versus substantially
equivalent standard in earlier case law] in terms of the degree to which foreign law must
conform to U.S. tax principles”). These 1983 proposed regulations also set forth detailed
guidance on dual capacity taxpayers that granted partial foreign tax credit relief for dual
capacity taxpayers if the foreign jurisdiction had a generally imposed income tax that applied
outside the extraction industry. For an analysis of this regulatory evolution through the
issuance of the 1983 proposed regulations, see Kevin D. Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit
Regulations as They Affect Petroleum Income—Post Mortem and Analysis, 83 TAX MGMT. INT’L
J. 3, 7–8 (1983). The final regulations issued on October 12, 1983 softened this dual capacity
standard by providing partial foreign tax credit relief would be available for dual capacity
taxpayers even if the foreign country did not have a generally applicable income tax that was
imposed on non-extraction taxpayers. Dolan, supra note 41.
43. See Hearing on Foreign Tax Credit for Oil and Gas Extraction Taxes before the House
Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. at 10–11 (1979) (stating that the proposed regulatory
changes and proposals to tighten I.R.C. § 907 limitations were “parallel but independent
efforts serving the same broad objective”); Dolan, supra note 41, at 3 (“Those outside of the
petroleum industry must first understand that the [1980 and 1983 amendments to the]
foreign tax credit regulations represent an administrative effort by the IRS and Treasury to
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culmination of an intensive regulatory effort, the Treasury
Department issued final section 901 regulations on October 12,
1983 that attacked the disguised oil royalty problem in two further
(and redundant) ways. 44 First, the 1983 final regulations provide
detailed rules in Regulation section 1.901-2A for dual capacity
taxpayers that give the government the ability to bifurcate foreign
levies between their tax and royalty components. 45 Second, the
promulgation of Regulation section 1.901-2A was a principled and
targeted response that provides an effective means of addressing the
disguised oil royalty problem on its own and made section 907’s
overbroad prescription for the same problem a redundancy. 46
As a result of much litigation that arose after its promulgation of
regulations under section 901 to address the disguised oil royalty
problem, a fascinating jurisprudence developed. This new
jurisprudence allows extraction taxes to remain creditable income
taxes in an amount in excess of the generally applicable income tax
under the facts and circumstances test set forth in Treasury
Regulation §1.901-2A(c). 47 The Treasury Department has indicated

limit the creditability of high rate foreign extraction taxes and that, absent concerns related to
extraction taxes, the regulation project would probably not have been undertaken.”).
44. T.D. 7918, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,272 (Oct. 12, 1983).
45. Dolan, supra note 41, at 168; Dolan, supra note 41, at 6–7. For a detailed
discussion of the dual capacity taxpayer regulatory framework in Treas. Reg § 1.901-2A, see
JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ B4.03 at ¶ [2][b]
(ThompsonReuters/WG&L 2014 with updates through March 2014); Kevin Dolan &
Caroline Dupuy, THE CREDITABILITY OF FOREIGN TAXES II.C.2, Tax Mgmt. Port. (2014
BNA) 901-2nd; Philip Postlewaite & Stephanie Renee Hoffer, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION:
CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL § 6.06, § 6.10 (5th ed. 2010); Marc M. Levey, Creditability of
a Foreign Tax: The Principles, The Regulations, and the Complexity, 3 J.L. & COM. 193, 216–
24 (1983).
46. See David R. Tillinghast, International Tax Simplification, 8 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 187,
227–28 (1990); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT,
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION: PROPOSALS ON UNITED
STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND THE FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES
PERSONS 338–41 (1987); Dolan & Dupuy, supra note 45, at VIII.B. (stating that “[s]ince
both the TEFRA § 907 amendments and the specific economic benefit rules of the § 901 and
§ 903 regulations address the issue of high rate extraction taxes, the issuance of those
regulations on the heels of TEFRA was arguably anticlimactic.”).
47. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 338 (1999) (UK petroleum tax held to
be creditable); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. 51 (1996), aff’d, 172 F.3d 209 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that Ontario mining tax was creditable); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r,
104 T.C. 256 (1995) (Norway’s surtax on petroleum activities was held to be creditable under
1980 temporary regulations); Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-1 C.B. 194 (the Indonesian petroleum
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that Congress should modify the dual capacity standard, presumably
to reverse taxpayer victories under the facts and circumstances test in
Treasury Regulation §1.901-2A(c). However, the Treasury
Department can bring about its reform proposal simply by
affirmatively removing its own facts and circumstances test contained
in Treasury Regulation §1.901-2A(c) and instead requiring taxpayers
to use the safe harbor of Treasury Regulation §1.901-2A(d). If this
regulatory amendment were made, the outcome of these changes
would mimic the result afforded under prior temporary regulations
and would achieve the result that the Treasury Department
inexplicably says it is now stymied from achieving. 48 Thus, the critical
point for policy-makers and scholars is that any further reform efforts
to address the disguised oil royalty problem can and should be
targeted at Treasury Regulation §1.901-2A without the need for
further redundant measures such as section 907.
However, even though reforming Regulation section 1.901-2A
would have been sufficient to solve the disguised oil royalty problem,
the Treasury Department still forged ahead to adopt a separate line
of attack on the disguised oil royalty problem. It revised the general
foreign tax credit eligibility standards under Regulation section
1.901-2 to mandate that all foreign levies must satisfy a mandatory,
formalistic, three-pronged test in order to be eligible for U.S. foreign
tax credit relief. This regulatory change was a further redundant
attack against the dreaded disguised oil royalty problem. 49
Regulation section 1.901-2 begins in a noncontroversial manner
by stating that a foreign tax’s “predominant character” must be that
of an income tax in order to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit
tax was modified after Rev. Rul. 76-215 had denied its eligibility for foreign tax credit relief
and the modified version was found to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief).
48. Compare TREASURY DEPARTMENT, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS at 26–27 (Feb. 2016), with
Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2A(d) (sets forth standard advocated by the Treasury Department in its
reform proposal, but this provision is an elective safe harbor; the Treasury Department can
simply mandate this standard instead of allowing its elective application), and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,641 (Apr. 5, 1983) (sets forth standard in proposed
regulations that the Treasury Department now says that it likes better).
49. See Glenn E. Coven, International Comity and the Foreign Tax Credit: Crediting
Nonconforming Taxes, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 83, 100–05 (1999). The formalistic, predominant
character standard set forth in the 1983 final regulations was originally developed by the IRS
chief counsel’s office as part of its litigation strategy against the disguised oil royalty problem.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,540 (Jan. 5, 1976); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,263
(Sept. 21, 1977); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,552 (Jan. 19, 1976).
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relief. 50 The 1983 final regulations further provide that a foreign levy
meets this “predominant character” standard if the foreign tax is
likely to reach net gain in the normal circumstances in which it
applies. 51 This “predominant character” phraseology and the desire
to determine whether “net gain” 52 is being taxed in the foreign
country harkens back to prior judicial case law that took a holistic,
substance-over-form inquiry of whether a foreign tax levy was
eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. However, it is at this point
that the 1983 final regulations diverge from prior case law, stating
that a tax will be conclusively determined to not meet the
“predominant character” standard unless the foreign tax levy satisfies
three specific formal design features. 53 Specifically, the foreign tax
must satisfy the realization test, 54 the gross receipts test, 55 and the net
income test. 56
These three formal regulatory tests are drawn from several lower
court decisions in the mid-1970s that arguably endorsed the idea
that a foreign tax levy must meet certain pre-defined formalistic
criteria in order for to be considered an income tax in the U.S.
sense. 57 Relying on the reasoning in these lower court decisions, the
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(1)(ii).
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(3) (as amended in 2012).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2012). For an excellent summary of the
prior case law and the efforts made in the 1983 final regulations to tighten up the standards
for allowing foreign tax credit relief, see Dolan, supra note 41.
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2012) (“A foreign tax satisfies the
realization requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, it is imposed (A)
[u]pon or subsequent to the occurrence of events (‘realization events’) that would result in the
realization of income under the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.”).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 2012) (“A foreign tax satisfies the
gross receipts requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, it is imposed on
the basis of (A) [g]ross receipts.”).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 2012) (“A foreign tax satisfies the
net income requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, the base of the tax
is computed by reducing gross receipts . . . to permit (A) [r]ecovery of the significant costs and
expenses . . . attributable, under reasonable principles, to such gross receipts; or (B) [r]ecovery
of such significant costs and expenses computed under a method that is likely to produce an
amount that approximates, or is greater than, recovery of such significant costs
and expenses.”).
57. See Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 72, 86–87 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (“The
[foreign tax] in its structure and express provisions thus permits the tax to be imposed on
unrealized income, a generally impermissible result for an income tax in the United States
sense.”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 523 (Ct. Cl.
1972) (states that U.S. foreign tax credit relief under § 901(b)(1) is available only if a “foreign
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1983 final regulations sought to stake out clear and prescriptive
standards for identifying the essential design features that a foreign
tax must have to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. 58
As to the net income test, a foreign net-basis tax is an income tax
in the U.S. sense if and only if the foreign levy allows for the
recovery of the taxpayer’s significant costs. 59 Instead of allowing

income tax[ is] designed to fall on some net gain or profit, and includes a gross income tax if,
but only if, that impost is almost sure, or very likely, to reach some net gain because costs or
expenses will not be so high as to offset the net profit”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v.
Comm’r, 61 T.C. 752, 762–63 (1974) (stating the following as to tests articulated by the
Claims Court were appropriate: “Perhaps the test which we and the Court of Claims have
articulated will not provide that magic touchstone whereby every situation in this area can be
precisely located in the spectrum of foreign taxes ranging from pure net income taxes on one
end to pure excise, sales, or privilege taxes on the other. But we are convinced that the test is
not ‘manufactured out of whole cloth,’ as petitioner would have us believe, and that it provides
a rational and manageable basis for interpretation of section 901(b)(1).”).
58. T.D. 7918, 1983-2 C.B. 113, 114. After endorsing the cases mentioned in supra
note 50, as authority for mandating that each foreign tax must separately and formalistically
satisfy pre-defined formal design features of the gross receipts test in Treas. Reg. §1.9012(b)(3)(i), a realization test in Treas. Reg. §1.901-2(b)(2)(i), and a net income test in Treas.
Reg. §1.901-2(b)(4)(i), the regulations then provided that each such test must be separately met
in order for a foreign levy payment to qualify for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. The Treasury
Department was transparent in its desire, stating in the preamble to T.D. 7918 as follows:
“The regulations set forth three tests for determining if a foreign tax is likely to reach net gain:
the realization test, the gross receipts test, and the net income test. All of these tests must be
met in order for the predominant character of the foreign tax to be that of an income tax in
the U.S. sense.” The government has been adamant in its litigating positions that the threepart test set forth in Regulation section 1.901-2(b) must be met in form in order for a foreign
tax to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. See Brief for Respondent at 95, PPL Corp. v.
Comm’r, 135 T.C. 304 (2010) (No. 25393-07) (“If a foreign tax fails to satisfy the ‘net gain’
requirement of the Regulations, it is not creditable for U.S. tax purposes. And the ‘net gain’
requirement requires an analysis of neither the underlying purpose of the foreign tax nor the
components of the foreign tax (to determine, for instance, if the Profit-Making Value is a
generally accepted method for valuing a Windfall Tax Company). Simply, the ‘net gain’
requirement requires that a foreign tax satisfy each of the three objective tests (realization,
gross receipts, and net income) to be creditable. The U.K. Windfall Tax fails to satisfy each of
the three net gain tests, and therefore it is not a creditable tax.”); Brief for Respondent, supra,
at 98 (“The regulation provides three specific tests, all of which a foreign tax must satisfy to be
deemed an income tax in the U.S. sense, and therefore creditable. These regulatory tests
neither permit nor require the application of these tests to the ‘substance’ of the tax.”); Brief
for Respondent at 38, Entergy v. Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 202 (2010) (No. 25132-06)
(“Finally, analysis of pre-regulation case law does not assist in the resolution of this case, since
petitioners do not dispute that the U.K. Windfall Tax must satisfy all three of the net gain
requirements of the regulations to qualify as a creditable tax.”).
59. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 2012). This net income
requirement was derived from several lower court decisions that pre-dated the regulations.
Bank of Am. Natl. Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 459 F.2d at 519 (Court of Claims stated that foreign
levy must attempt to reach some net gain in the normal circumstances in which the tax
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deductions for actual significant expenses, foreign law can allow
reductions of the tax base as long as the substitute methodology is
likely to produce an amount that approximates, or is greater than, a
recovery of all significant costs and expenses. 60 Furthermore,
although foreign law can allow for a different period for cost
recovery than is allowed under U.S. law, the net income requirement
is not met if the deferral of cost recovery effectively represents a
denial of such recovery. 61 In addition, the net income test in the
1983 final regulations provides that a foreign tax levy must usually
allow losses incurred in any aspect of a trade or business in the taxing
country to offset profits earned in other aspects of the business. 62
Taken as a whole, the 1983 final regulations posit that an income tax
in the U.S. sense must allow for a recovery of all significant business
expenditures (or their economic equivalent) in some
reasonable period.
Thus, except for gross withholding taxes imposed on investment
income where a substantial business expense is unlikely to exist, the
1983 final regulations purport to draw a bright line to prevent
formulary taxes from being creditable when assessed on active
business income. The issue of whether section 901 was intended to
provide relief only for net income taxes or for gross income taxes has
been the subject of scholarly debate for over sixty years, and there is
little indication that the original Congress that adopted the U.S.
applies); see also Bank of Am. Natl. Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 61 T.C. at 760 (Tax Court accepted
that the governing test to determine whether a foreign tax qualifies as a creditable income tax
is whether the tax was “designed to fall on some net gain or profit”).
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i)(B) (as amended in 2012). In Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 107 TC 51, 72 (1996), aff’d, 172 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 1999), the court held that a
“processing allowance” under an Ontario mining tax effectively compensated for a lack of
deductions for interest, royalties, and other items because multiyear data for the taxpayer and
most other companies subject to the tax showed that the allowance exceeded the disallowed
costs in the aggregate and in most years. “Use of aggregate data is appropriate because a tax is
or is not creditable for all taxpayers subject to it.” Exxon Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 338 at
*12 (1999) (PRT imposed by the United Kingdom was held to have met the net income
requirement notwithstanding the lack of deduction for interest expense because “special
allowances and reliefs” were given that as a factual matter exceeded the disallowed
interest expense).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 2012).
62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(ii) (as amended in 2012) (if a loss in one activity of
the business is never allowed against income from other activities of the business, the loss must
be carried to other periods so that it can be used as a deduction against profits from the same
activity in other periods, and the period of carryover and carryback must not be so restricted so
as to effectively represent a denial of cost recovery).
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foreign tax credit gave this issue much thought. 63 Although
Congress’ early desire may be in doubt, there is no doubt that the
Treasury Department, by promulgating its 1983 final regulations,
wanted to overturn prior case law 64 to the extent that prior case law
allowed U.S. foreign tax credit relief for a gross formulary tax on
business profits that did not provide a deduction for all significant
business expenses. Consequently, whereas the pre-1983 case law had
provided for a broad subjective inquiry into whether the intent of
the foreign levy was to reach net income, 65 commentators 66 and the
courts 67 recognized early on that the 1983 regulations represented a
change to prior law as they attempted to provide a prescriptive list of
formal requirements that in form must be met. To ensure nobody
missed this conclusion, after issuing the 1983 final regulations, the
63. See Stanley S. Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment,
56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 819–22 (1956) (makes this point); see also H.R. REP. NO. 65-767 at
11 (1918); 56 CONG. REC. 667–78 (1918).
64. For an example of a pre-1983 case that the 1983 final regulations intended to
overrule, see Seatrain Lines Inc. v. Comm’r, 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942), nonacq. 1942-2 C.B. 31.
In Seatrain, Cuba had imposed a formulary tax upon realized gain. In order to resolve a
dispute over the amount of deductible expenses, the Cuban government substituted a 3% tax
on gross shipping income for a 6% tax on net profits. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the
tax was creditable because the tax was imposed on gain realized under U.S. standards and
because the intent of the lower gross tax was to simulate the earlier net income tax at that
higher rate. For a discussion of this more lenient line of authority, see Owens, supra note 18, at
46. For an excellent summary of the prior case law and the efforts made in the 1983 final
regulations to tighten up the standards for allowing foreign tax credit relief, Dolan, supra note
41; see also Coven, supra note 49, at 100–05, 114–16.
65. See Bank of Am. Nat’l. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n. v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 519 (Ct.
Cl. 1972).
66. See Dolan, supra note 41, at 169 (stating that “[f]ortunately, the regulations provide
specific tests for determining whether the general Bank of America standard is satisfied.”). Mr.
Dolan was in the government and played an active role in drafting the 1983 regulations.
67. See Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. 51, 73 n.3 (1996), aff’d, 172 F.3d 209 (2d
Cir. 1999) (quoting Dolan commentary cited in note 42 with approval). In discussing the
import of the 1983 final regulations, the Tax Court observed as follows:
The preamble states that the regulations adopt the creditability criterion from
certain cases to use in deciding whether the predominant character of a foreign tax is
likely to reach net gain for purposes of section 1.901-2(a)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs.
The preamble states that a tax is likely to reach net gain if it meets three tests
provided in the regulations. The regulations provide objective and quantitative
standards that were not used in cases which decided creditability of foreign taxes before
the regulations became final. Regulations can supersede prior case law to the extent
that they provide requirements and definitions not found in prior case law. See
Bowater Inc. v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 207, 212 (1993); Nissho Iwai Am. Corp. v.
Comm’r, 89 T.C. 765, 776-77 (1987); Texasgulf, Inc., 107 T.C. at 73 n.3
(emphasis and scoring added).
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IRS revoked fifty years of prior section 901 revenue ruling positions68
and reversed long-standing IRS acquiescences in prior section 901
cases 69 whenever those prior rulings were inconsistent with the
government’s
new
predominant
character
standard
for
credit eligibility. 70
The formality imposed by the 1983 final regulations had a
specific goal, namely to represent a redundant attack on the
objectionable disguised oil royalty problem that at the time was
taking all the oxygen out of the room. 71 In this regard, the
objectionable extraction taxes often were levied based at least in part
on a formulary basis. 72 Because of this, tightening the section 901
eligibility standards with a new predominant character standard that
required cost recovery for all of the significant costs (or allow for a
substitute deduction equal to or greater than such costs) provided
another cogent basis to disallow credit relief for disguised
oil royalties. 73

68. Initially, the IRS did not challenge the foreign tax credit generator aspects of foreign
taxes paid under production sharing agreements that generated inflated amounts of U.S.
foreign tax credits. See Rev. Rul. 69-388, 1969-2 C.B. 154 (Indonesia imposed a special tax by
contract for companies operating in oil and gas producing regions in Indonesia held to be a
creditable “in lieu of” tax under I.R.C. § 903; this ruling was colloquially known and
“Indonesia I” in the industry). The IRS subsequently revoked Indonesia I. See Rev. Rul. 76215, 1976-1 C.B. 194 (stating that the payment was in substance a royalty, not a tax, and
therefore not eligible for U.S. tax credit relief under either I.R.C. § 901 or I.R.C. § 903; this
ruling was colloquially known as “Indonesia II” in the industry). But, by the mid-1970s, the
IRS decided to launch its own assault on these “disguised oil royalty arrangements” even as
Congress added a new foreign tax credit basket to address this same phenomenon. See Coven,
supra note 49, at 100–05 (analyzing reversal of the historic IRS position as set forth in its
prior rulings).
69. See Rev. Rul. 84-172, 1984-2 C.B. 315 (declaring each of the following rulings
obsolete after adoption of final regulations: Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-1 C.B. 194; Rev. Rul. 7861, 1978-1 C.B. 221; Rev. Rul. 78-62, 1978-1 C.B. 226; Rev. Rul. 78-63, 1978-1 C.B. 228);
see also Coven, supra note 49, at 101–03.
70. See Coven, supra note 49, at 101–03.
71. Kevin D. Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit Regulations as They Affect Petroleum Income—
Post Mortem and Analysis, 83 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 3–4 (1983).
72. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-388, 1969-2 C.B. 154, revoked by Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-1
C.B. 194; Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386 (Saudi Arabia’s imposed surtax equal to a
percentage of the posted price per barrel of oil was held to be a creditable income tax); Rev.
Rul. 68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306 (a surtax imposed by Libya based on a posted price per barrel
on holders of petroleum concessions was held to be a creditable income tax). Rev. Rul. 55-296
and Rev. Rul. 68-552 were both revoked by Rev. Rul. 78-63, 1978-1 C.B. 228. For a
discussion of this parallel effort, see Coven, supra note 49, at 114–16.
73. See Coven, supra note 49, at 114–16.
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Thus, as of the end of 1983, three redundant policy responses
had been leveled against the singular disguised oil royalty problem.
First, section 907 set forth a specialized limitation for extraction
taxes to prevent the cross-crediting of extraction taxes. Second, new
dual capacity taxpayer regulations under Regulation section 1.9012A denied foreign tax credit relief for the royalty portion of any
foreign tax levy. Third, the foreign tax credit eligibility standards set
forth in Regulation section 1.901-2(b) were tightened for all
taxpayers to make it much more difficult for formulary taxes to be
creditable. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in PPL Corp. v.
Commissioner, 74 the revolutionary nature of these changes could not
be underestimated. As Professor Coven forcefully pointed out fifteen
years ago, the appropriate U.S. response to the disguised oil royalty
problem was to treat the portion of any purported foreign tax
payment as a non-tax payment to the extent such payment was made
in return for a specific economic benefit. 75 But unfortunately, the
government’s response was much more expansive than necessary.
The Treasury Department’s detailed dual-capacity regulation set
forth in Regulation section 1.901-2A provides an adequate means to
solve the dual-capacity problem by bifurcating payments made by a
dual-capacity taxpayer into a tax component and a non-tax
component. 76 After this bifurcation, Regulation section 1.901-2A
provides that only the portion of the bifurcated payment that is
considered a tax payment is eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit
relief—assuming all other section 901 requirements are satisfied.77
Thus, it was not necessary for the Treasury Department to adopt the
formalistic three-pronged predominant character standard in
Regulation section 1.901-2(b). The regulation redundantly tried to
solve the same disguised oil royalty problem that Regulation section
1.901-2A is better designed to solve. In addition, Regulation section
1.901-2A, once adopted, made section 907 redundant as well. 78 In
other words, the Treasury Department responded to one observable
problem (the disguised oil royalty problem) with complex and

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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See PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 1897 (2013).
See Coven, supra note 49, at 103–04.
See Treas. Reg. §1.901-2A (1983); see also authorities cited in note 42.
Treas. Reg. §1.901-2A(a)(1).
See authorities cited in note 41.
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redundant changes to the foreign tax credit regime when only one
principled response was needed.
Furthermore, unlike Regulation section 1.901-2A’s targeted and
coherent approach to the objectionable disguised oil royalty
problem, Congress’ overbroad enactment of section 907 and the
Treasury Department’s overbroad effort to rewrite the foreign tax
credit eligibility standards lead to incoherent outcomes. These
redundant attacks restrict or deny foreign tax credit relief for foreign
income taxes that are paid in nonobjectionable ways and are not
disguised oil royalties.
2. PPL’s damage to the formalistic predominant character standard
This prior analysis represents the factual background that should
be considered when one approaches the Supreme Court’s decision in
PPL Corp. v. Commissioner. 79 The U.K. windfall profits tax in the
PPL litigation provided for a one-time twenty-three percent
formulary assessment tax on all privatized utility companies. This tax
applied to the difference between a company’s “profit-making
value” 80 and the price for which the company was privatized. 81
Under the case law that pre-dated the 1983 regulatory changes,
the above-described U.K. windfall profits tax would have been
eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. Earlier iterations of U.K.
excess profits tax regimes considered in the pre-1983 period had
been found to be creditable, 82 and IRS administrative practice stated
that a wide range of analogous excess profits regimes met the

79. See PPL Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1897.
80. For this purpose, “profit-making value was defined as its average annual profit per
day over an initial period that was generally a four-year period and then this amount was
multiplied by nine. The number nine was chosen as a baseline ‘price-to-earnings ratio.’
Although described as a tax on excess value, the tax had the economic effects of a tax on excess
profits because the calculation of ‘value in profits terms’ was based on average net income over
the four-year period, rather than on an actual measure of value (which could have easily been
established from market data) and so from an economic point of view the U.K. windfall profits
tax was a tax on excess profits. See Brief for Amici Curiae Rosanne Altshuler, Richard M. Bird,
Malcom Gillis, Arnold C. Harberger, Gary C. Hufbauer, Charles E. McLure, Jr., Jack Mintz,
& George R. Zodrow at 8–9, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 1897 (2013) (No. 12-43).
81. See Entergy v. Comm’r, 683 F.3d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 2012).
82. See Robertson v. Comm’r, 176 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1949); Ethyl Corp. v. United
States, 75 F. Supp. 461 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Colombian Carbon Co. v. Comm’r, 25 B.T.A. 456
(1932), acq., 1932-1 C.B. 2.
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eligibility standards set forth in the pre-1983 case law. 83 The IRS had
even ruled that a tax levy imposed on average profits spanning
multiple years, much like the U.K. windfall profits tax that was the
subject of the PPL litigation, was entitled to U.S. foreign tax
credit relief. 84
But these cases and administrative pronouncements preceded the
1983 regulatory amendments to Regulation section 1.901-2(b),
and, as the Tax Court recognized in its Texasgulf decision,
“[r]egulations [under Regulation section 1.901-2] can supersede
prior case law to the extent that they provide requirements and
definitions not found in prior case law.” 85 Thus, the PPL case is
interesting precisely because the taxpayer substantively satisfied the
standards for U.S. foreign tax credit relief under the historic pre1983 case law criteria (a conclusion the IRS National Office appears
to have accepted before the litigation or at least did not refute).86
Even so, the U.K. windfall profits tax failed to comply with the
three-pronged predominant character standard that was put into
place in response to the disguised oil royalty problem.
To add further intrigue, the IRS asserted the formalistic aspects
of the predominant character standard set forth in Regulation
section 1.901-2(b) against PPL even though the government did not

83. See Rev. Rul. 68-318, 1968-1 C.B. 342 (Italian tax on profits in excess of six percent
of capital); Rev. Rul. 56-51, 1956-1 C.B. 320 (Cuban tax on profits in excess of 1/10th of
estimated real worth of capital). Another ruling concluded that a tax imposed at variable rates
was creditable. Rev. Rul. 74-435, 1974-2 C.B. 204 (Swiss Cantonal tax imposed at variable
rates on multi-year profits was creditable).
84. See Columbian Carbon Co. v. Comm’r, 25 B.T.A. 456, 463 (1932), acq., 1932-1
C.B. 2 (Service contested timing of accrual, but not creditability of U.K. tax based on average
profits of three-year period preceding assessment year); see also Rev. Rul. 69-446, 1969-2 C.B.
150 (Swiss National Defense Tax, which is imposed on average profits for the two years
preceding the assessment year, is an income tax).
85. Texasgulf, Inc., 107 T.C. at 69. See quote from Texasgulf, Inc in note 60. Also, the
government was categorical to the Tax Court, stating that the pre-1983 case law was of “little
consequence” and that the 1983 final regulations superseded prior case law. See Reply Brief of
Respondent, at 93–99, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 304 (2010) (No. 25393-07).
86. It is interesting to note at this point that the IRS National Office appeared to have
agreed that the pre-1983 case law was supportive of the taxpayer’s position even before the
PPL litigation, but after analyzing that favorable case law the IRS National Office then argued
that the government had authority to change the standards for creditability in its final 1983
Treasury regulations and then stated as follows: “analysis of pre-regulation case law does not
assist in the resolution of this case, since Taxpayer does not dispute that the U.K. Windfall Tax
must satisfy the net gain test of the regulations to qualify as a creditable tax.” PLR 200719011
(May 11, 2007).
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contend that PPL was a dual-capacity taxpayer or that the U.K.
windfall profits tax was a disguised royalty. 87 Rather, the government
used the overbroad formality of Regulation section 1.901-2(b) to
make an incoherent attack on the foreign tax credit eligibility of
foreign taxes paid by PPL in a nonobjectionable transaction. PPL,
therefore, was at risk of being counted as collateral damage in the
government’s foreign tax credit war.
The Tax Court held that PPL was entitled to foreign tax credit
relief, finding as a factual matter that the U.K. windfall profits tax
was designed to reach net income and did in fact tax net income in
all cases. 88 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s
decision. 89 In its appeal to the Third Circuit, the government
asserted, 90 and the Third Circuit accepted, 91 that the U.K. windfall
profits tax used a tax base greater than gross receipts and therefore
failed the gross receipts test contained in the 1983 final regulations. 92
As an additional ground for reversal, the government asserted, 93 and
87. See PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 571 (2013).
88. The Tax Court stated as follows:
Parliament did, in fact, enact a tax that operated as an excess profits tax for the vast
majority of the windfall tax companies. The design of the windfall tax formula made
certain that the tax would, in fact, operate as an excess profits tax for the vast
majority of the companies subject to it.
Because both the design and effect of the windfall tax was to tax an amount that,
under U.S. tax principles, may be considered excess profits realized by the vast
majority of the windfall tax companies, we find that it did, in fact, “reach net gain in
the normal circumstances in which it [applied]”, and, therefore, that its
“predominant character” was “that of an income tax in the U.S. sense.”
PPL Corp., 135 T.C. at 340–41.
89. See PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 665 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011).
90. See Opening Brief for the Appellant at 23–29, 30–33, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 665
F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1069). The government repeated this argument in its briefs
before the Supreme Court. See Brief of the Respondent at 33–43, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133
S. Ct. 1897 (No. 12-43).
91. PPL Corp., 665 F.3d at 67–68 (observing that the Third Circuit so held).
92. Id. at 65 (“In our view, PPL’s formulation of the substance of the U.K. Windfall
Profits Tax is a bridge too far. No matter how many of PPL’s proposed simplifications we may
accept, we return to a fundamental problem: the tax base cannot be initial period profit alone
unless we rewrite the tax rate. Under the Treasury Department’s regulation, we cannot do
that.”); Opening Brief for the Appellant at 31–32, PPL Corp., 665 F.3d 60 (No. 11-11069)
(The windfall profits tax was then “imposed on the difference between profit-making value and
flotation value, and a tax on the value of property does not have the predominant character of
an income tax in the U.S. sense. Thus, the tax base for the windfall profits tax was completely
divorced from any traditional concept of gross receipts.”).
93. The government asserted the following in its Opening Brief at 24–25, PPL Corp.,
665 F.3d 60 (No. 11-1069):
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the Third Circuit accepted, 94 that the U.K. windfall profits tax also
failed to satisfy the realization test set forth in the 1983 final
regulations. 95 Because these formalistic criteria were not satisfied, the
Third Circuit found that the U.K. windfall profits tax failed two out
of the three mandatory tests contained in the 1983 final regulations’
predominant character standard and therefore was ineligible for U.S.
foreign tax credit relief. 96
The Third Circuit denied foreign tax credit relief to the taxpayer
in PPL, but it nowhere contested the Tax Court’s factual
determination 97 that the U.K. windfall profits tax actually achieved its
intended operational purpose of taxing only net income. 98 Thus, in
one sense, the PPL case represents an odd case for disallowing
foreign tax credit relief because the Tax Court made a finding of fact
that the U.K. windfall profits tax operated as a tax levied on net
income99 and resulted in a levy of some amount less than total net
profits in all cases. 100 Yet, the Third Circuit held that the U.K.
[I]t is well-established that under U.S. tax law, a tax on value or appreciation is not a
tax on realized income (and thus does not have the predominant character of an
income tax in the U.S. sense. See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 559
(1991); Tatum v. Comm’r, 400 F.2d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1968) (“Thus far Congress
has not seen fit to tax unrealized appreciation in property value.”).
Nor was the windfall tax a tax upon previously realized income. The fact that a
company’s profit making value was determined by reference to past profits does not
convert the windfall tax into a tax on those past profits. Indeed, a tax on incomeproducing property does not become an income tax simply because the property’s
value is calculated for tax purposes by reference to the amount of income the
property generates.
The government repeated these arguments before the Supreme Court. See Brief of the
Respondent at 35–36, PPL Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1897 (No. 12-43).
94. See PPL Corp., 665 F.3d at 67 n.3 (observing that Third Circuit so held).
95. Id.
96. See PPL Corp., 665 F.3d at 67 n.3.
97. The Tax Court made specific findings of fact indicating that they found that the
legislative intent for the U.K. windfall profits tax was to assess a tax on excess profits and the
Third Circuit nowhere contests these findings. PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 304, 339–40
(2010), rev’d, 665 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011).
98. PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, 133 S. Ct. 1897, 1903 (2013) (noting that the Third
Circuit explicitly discussed its concerns regarding the gross receipts and
realization requirements).
99. The Third Circuit is silent on this point, but the Fifth Circuit makes the statement
categorically as follows: “the tax only reached — and only could reach — utilities that realized a
profit in the relevant period, calculating profit in the ordinary sense (e.g. by subtracting
operating expenses associated with generating the utilities’ income). This satisfies the net
income requirement.” See Entergy v. Comm’r, 683 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2012).
100. PPL Corp.,135 T.C. at 338, 341.
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windfall profits tax was non-creditable for U.S. foreign tax credit
purposes because the formal design of the U.K. windfall profits tax,
which included formulary tax aspects, failed to comply with the strict
requirements of the 1983 final regulations. 101
The Fifth Circuit in Entergy v. Commissioner 102 held that this
same U.K. windfall profits tax was entitled to U.S. foreign tax credit
relief, 103 thus creating a split in the circuits. In its evaluation of the
Third Circuit’s plain textual reading of the 1983 final regulations,
the Fifth Circuit in Entergy 104 stated that the Third Circuit’s denial of
foreign tax credit relief exalted “form-over-substance.” 105 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in PPL Corp. v. Commissioner to
resolve the circuit split. 106
The facts set forth in the PPL case put squarely at issue whether
the formalistic predominant character standard would deny foreign
tax credit relief to a non-dual-capacity taxpayer who paid a formulary
tax that would have been entitled to relief under pre-1983 case law.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the U.K. windfall profits
tax was entitled to U.S. foreign tax credit relief, thus reversing the
Third Circuit’s decision and affirming the Tax Court’s original
decision. But, in the course of its opinion, the Court omitted any
detailed discussion of the mandatory formalistic predominant
character test set forth in the 1983 final regulations. Instead of
discussing how the 1983 final regulations had attempted to impose a

101. See PPL Corp., 665 F.3d at 67 n.3.
102. Entergy, 683 F.3d at 233.
103. Id. at 239.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 237. The Fifth Circuit explained its disagreement with the Third Circuit’s
analysis as follows: “In fact, as the record indicates, each utility could only be subject to the
Windfall Tax after making a profit exceeding approximately an 11% annual return on its initial
flotation value, and the Windfall Tax liability increased linearly with additional profits past that
point. Moreover, the Third Circuit opinion seems to overlook that a tax based on actual
financial profits in the U.K. sense necessarily begins with gross receipts, as, again, the record
here indicates. London Electricity’s profit for purpose of the Windfall Tax was calculated by
computing gross receipts less operating expenses. The Windfall Tax was designed to reach a
subset of this leftover amount by beginning with an amount predicated on actual gross receipts
minus flotation value.” Id. at 233 (internal italics omitted). In affirming the Tax Court’s
allowance of foreign tax credit relief to the taxpayer in Entergy v. Commissioner, the Fifth
Circuit reformulated the U.K. windfall profits tax into an economically equivalent formulation
that (as reformulated) did meet the three formal design features of the 1983 final regulations.
See id. at 238–39.
106. See PPL Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1897.
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formalistic approach, the Court attempted to harmonize the
predominant character standard contained in the 1983 final
regulations with the pre-1983 case law, stating that Regulation
section 1.901-2(b) “codifies longstanding doctrine dating back to
Biddle.” 107 The Court omitted any serious discussion of the
government’s assertion that its formalistic predominant character
standard was intended to bring “structure and clarity” not found in
the earlier case law. 108
As to the argument that the 1983 final regulations established a
set of requirements that must be met in form, 109 the Court stated
that this notion could not be squared with the black-letter principle
that “tax laws deal in economic realities, not legal abstractions.”110
The Supreme Court eschewed any effort to apply the formal
requirements of the predominant character standard set forth in the
1983 final regulations and instead used a holistic analysis reminiscent
of the pre-1983 case law. In doing so, the Court opined that
substance over form principles compel a conclusion “that the

107. See id. at 1901.
108. Compare id. at 1905 (where Court discusses portions of the government brief
dealing with pre-1983 case law), with Brief for Respondent at 33–43, PPL v. Comm’r, 133 S.
Ct. 1897 (2013) (No. 12-43) (where the government asserts that the formalistic threepronged test set forth in the 1983 Treasury regulations is entitled to deference under Mayo
Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011)). The
government’s argument was more robust in its brief before the Third Circuit and the Fifth
Circuit as the following excerpt from its briefs in those proceedings so indicates: “[T]he Tax
Court was required to accord the regulation Chevron deference. See Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct.
704. Moreover, “because § 901’s exemption from taxation is ‘a privilege extended by
legislative grace’” the regulation had to be “strictly construed.” Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r,
172 F.3d 209, 214 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 72, 79
(Ct. Cl. 1982)). Instead, the Tax Court paid only lip service to the regulation. Although it
discussed the regulation in summarizing the relevant legal principles (JA27-29), the court went
on to apply its own test for determining the predominant character of the windfall tax. Thus,
the court considered at length the historical background and purpose of the windfall tax and
its effect on the companies subject to the tax. It made no effort whatsoever to explain whether
the windfall tax met any of the three regulatory subtests, all of which had to be met for the tax
to be creditable.” Compare Brief for Appellant at 24, Entergy v. Comm’r, 683 F.3d 233 (5th
Cir. 2012) (No. 10-60988) with Brief for Appellant at 21–22, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 665
F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1069).
109. See PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 304, 330 (2010) (“Respondent argues that the
1983 regulations alone control the creditability of the windfall tax because those regulations
subsume or supersede prior caselaw and ‘neither require nor permit inquiry into the purpose
underlying the enactment of a foreign tax or the history of a foreign taxing statute.’”).
110. PPL Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1905.
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windfall [profits] tax is [best viewed as] nothing more than a tax on
actual profits above a threshold.” 111
Admittedly, the formalistic predominant character test set forth
in the 1983 final regulations would have created an incoherent result
if applied to deny foreign tax credit relief to PPL as PPL was not the
intended target of these technical rules. Nevertheless, by not
resolving the PPL case within the formal guidelines of the
predominant character test and failing to discuss the fact that the
1983 final regulations attempted to impose a formalistic set of
requirements in lieu of the more holistic approach used in the pre1983 case law, the Supreme Court cast considerable doubt on the
continued validity of the 1983 final regulation’s mandatory
formalistic predominant character standard. Said differently, the
Supreme Court’s revisionist history undermines the formalistic
predominant character standard set forth in the 1983 Treasury
regulation. It places a heavy judicial gloss over those regulations to
harmonize them with “longstanding doctrine dating back to
Biddle” 112 when in fact the 1983 final regulations attempted to
impose formality to the foreign tax credit eligibility analysis in order
to provide “structure and clarity” not found in the prior case law. 113
3.

Indopco’s
damage
character standard

to

the

formalistic

predominant

The Supreme Court’s decision in PPL did serious damage to the
plain meaning of the 1983 final regulations. The decision ignored
the intended plain meaning of the 1983 final regulations and instead
harmonized those 1983 final regulations with pre-1983 case law.
The PPL decision, by itself, provides a sufficient reason for the
Treasury Department to rewrite its existing section 901 regulations
to provide a coherent standard for determining foreign tax credit
eligibility using standards that are consistent with the Supreme
Court’s holistic approach that harkens back to the pre-1983 case law.
However, as discussed in this Section and the next, there are two
other compelling reasons for the Treasury Department to open a

111. Id.
112. See id. at 1901, 1905 (stating that the regulations codify longstanding doctrine
dating back to Biddle and then use “substance over form” principles to resolve the case).
113. See supra note 96.
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regulatory project to rewrite the foreign tax credit eligibility
standards contained in Regulation section 1.901-2(b).
First, the regulatory predominant character standard fails to
reflect the evolution in the U.S. income tax laws that has occurred
since 1983 and consequently utilizes standards that no longer
accurately identify an income tax in the U.S. sense. Second, the
Internal Revenue Service, through its published guidance, has
repeatedly ignored its own 1983 regulations in determining the
eligibility of recent formulary-type tax regimes of other countries.
Thus, because the Supreme Court refuses to apply the intended plain
meaning of the 1983 regulations and because those regulations fail
to properly describe the evolution of the U.S. income tax law that
has occurred since their promulgation and because the IRS ignores
the regulations it is charged with implementing (creating a de facto
administrative law at variance with published regulations), the
United States’ foreign tax credit regime is incoherent and
needs reformulation.
As a beginning point of the analysis in this Section, the
conclusion from Section II.A.1 must be kept in mind, namely that
the 1983 final regulations posit that an income tax in the U.S. sense
must allow for a recovery of all significant business expenditures (or
their economic equivalent) in some reasonable period. 114 However,
contrary to the 1983 final regulation’s requirement that all
significant business expenditures (or an equivalent amount) must be
recoverable as an essential feature of an income tax in the U.S. sense,
the IRS argued in 1992 in Indopco v. Commissioner 115 for the exact
opposite position in a domestic tax context. In fact, the government
in Indopco contended that allowing recovery for expenses was simply
a matter of legislative grace and not an essential design feature of an
income tax in the U.S. sense. 116 Nowhere in the government’s
Indopco briefs did it mention that it had a final section 901
regulation (entitled to Chevron deference) that estopped the
government from arguing that the deductibility of all valid business
expenditures was necessary to correctly reflect taxpayer income and
an essential feature of the U.S. income tax laws. No, the government

114. See text accompanying notes 44–55.
115. Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
116. Brief for Respondent at 30–31, Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1991)
(No. 90-1278).
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in Indopco urged the Supreme Court to disallow cost recovery for
expenses if those expenses provided a future benefit even when no
separate and distinct asset was created that could allow for future
cost recovery. 117 In contrast, the taxpayer in Indopco urged the
Supreme Court not to require capitalization unless a separate and
distinct asset was created because capitalization without cost
recovery failed to clearly reflect the taxpayer’s income. 118
117. It is important to note how many times the government states that there are
“many” instances where significant expenses are not allowed for recovery under the U.S.
income tax laws as of 1992: “If an expenditure produces a permanent or long-term benefit to
the taxpayer that will help generate income in future years, it hardly would reflect the
taxpayer’s income to allow a current deduction for the expenditure merely because the benefit
or advantage cannot readily be described as creating or enhancing an ‘asset.’ Indeed, the
situation presented in this case provides a perfect example of the inadequacy of petitioner’s
‘separate and distinct asset’ test. Petitioner does not challenge the findings of the Tax Court
(Pet. App. 30a) and the court of appeals (Pet. App. 12a) that the takeover transaction resulted
in permanent benefits for petitioner. Application of the test urged by petitioner-under which
outlays may be deducted in one year even though the benefits of the expense are reaped for
many years in the future-would result in a distortion of petitioner’s income. For this reason
alone, petitioner’s test should be rejected. The courts have recognized many types of capital
expenses that do not create or enhance any specific asset. Most relevant are the “changed
corporate structure” cases discussed in Section II.A.1. In these cases, as then-Judge Blackmun
noted in General Bancshares, 326 F.2d at 716, even when the reorganization expenses ‘have
not resulted in the acquisition or increase of a corporate asset, [they are treated as capital
charges and] are not, because of that fact, deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses.’ Similarly, in Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 547 (1928), which
was cited in General Bancshares, the court observed that ‘it can be argued, and not without
merit, that no capital asset is acquired when attorneys’ fees are paid in connection with an
increase in capitalization, but it does not follow that the payments are ordinary and necessary
expenses of the year when made.’ 11 B.T.A. at 556. The mere fact that a corporation’s
structure is not a ‘separate and distinct asset’ does not mean that expenses incurred to alter its
structure for the permanent betterment of the corporation are not capital in nature. There are
many other examples of business expenditures that have long been recognized as capital in
nature even though they do not create or enhance any specific asset. The cost of an educational
program that qualifies the taxpayer to enter a new trade or business is a non-deductible capital
expenditure.” See Brief for Respondent at 30–31, Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992)
(No. 90-1278) (emphasis added).
118. Consistent with the government’s argument in PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, the taxpayer
in Indopco argued that the Supreme Court must ensure that significant business expenditures
must be recoverable over some period as indicated in the following statement from the
taxpayer’s brief:
Moreover, by requiring the identification of a specific asset to which capitalized
costs are to be assigned, the Lincoln Savings test serves the clear reflection of
income principle that underlies the statutory scheme-it permits such costs to be
depreciated or amortized over the useful life of the asset and to be recovered upon
its sale or other disposition. In contrast, the court of appeals’ future benefit
approach does not give taxpayers any means of recovering their capitalized costs.
Where there is a future benefit but no asset to which capitalized costs can be
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In a strongly worded and staunchly pro-government opinion, the
Supreme Court stated that an income tax in the U.S. sense means
gross income and that the allowance of deductions is purely a matter
of legislative grace. The following extended excerpt from the Indopco
case is relevant for understanding the nature of the U.S. income tax
system as now understood and interpreted by the Supreme Court:
In exploring the relationship between deductions and capital
expenditures, this Court has noted the “familiar rule” that “an
income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the
burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on
the taxpayer.” The notion that deductions are exceptions to the
norm of capitalization finds support in various aspects of the Code.
Deductions are specifically enumerated and thus are subject to
disallowance in favor of capitalization. Nondeductible capital
expenditures, by contrast, are not exhaustively enumerated in the
Code; rather than providing a “complete list of nondeductible
expenditures,” serves as a general means of distinguishing capital
expenditures from current expenses. For these reasons, deductions
are strictly construed and allowed only “as there is a clear
provision therefor.” 119

Even if one views the Supreme Court’s statement that
deductions are given simply as a matter of legislative grace as
hyperbole, no one could avoid seeing that the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Indopco went out of its way to harken back to case law
dating back to its 1934 holding that Congress has the unquestioned
“power to condition, limit, or deny deductions from gross income in
order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax.” 120
Indopco also makes clear that the Court would not entertain
criticism of Congress’s refusal to allow cost recovery for a significant
business expenditure. Consequently, post-Indopco, the net income
test set forth in the 1983 final regulations is at variance with what
the government argued was the essential design feature of an income

assigned, the taxpayer will not be allowed any depreciation or amortization
deductions or any deductible loss prior to the sale or abandonment of its entire
business. Thus, the future benefit approach, by thwarting any recovery of capitalized
costs during the period in which the taxpayer is operating its business and earning
the income generated by those costs, defeats a clear reflection of income.
Brief for Petitioner at 13, Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (No. 90-1278).
119. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 84 n.4 (citations omitted; footnote omitted).
120. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934).
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tax in the U.S. sense. In 1992, the government told the Court in
Indopco that there are “many . . . examples” 121 under U.S. tax law of
business-related expenditures that do not create deductible expenses
and never provide cost recovery. 122 Yet when judging a foreign
country’s tax levy, the predominant character standard in the 1983
final regulations mandates that all significant expenses must be
entitled to cost recovery in order for foreign levy to be considered an
income tax “in the U.S. sense.” 123 The insistence by Regulation
section 1.901-2(b) that all significant costs must be recoverable in
the foreign country’s tax regime is diametrically opposed to what the
government asserted in Indopco about our own income tax regime.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Indopco also endorsed the
government’s view that allowing deductions was a matter of
legislative grace and not a requirement for a tax levy to be
considered an income tax in the U.S. sense. Thus, the requirement
in the 1983 final regulations that cost recovery must be given for all
significant expenses may have represented a reasonable interpretation
of the U.S. case law in 1983, but that interpretation is no longer
reasonable in 2016 because of the Supreme Court’s intervening
1992 decision in Indopco. The net income test in the 1983 final
regulations has been eroded, and the government was the one that
argued for its erosion. In short, the government persuaded the
Supreme Court to hold that significant expenses need not be allowed
cost recovery in order to clearly reflect income under the U.S.
income tax laws in Indopco. As a result, it is fundamentally
inconsistent for the government to now argue that cost recovery for
all significant expenses is a necessary feature for foreign levies to
represent an income tax in the U.S. sense.
To compound the judicial erosion of the net income
requirement, Congress has enacted significant disallowance rules,
further demonstrating the inaccuracies of the 1983 final regulations’
assertion that all significant expenses must be allowed cost

121. See supra note 102 (emphasis added).
122. See Brief for Respondent at 30–31, Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (No.
90-1278).
123. This is the standard in the existing Treasury regulations that require the
predominant character of a foreign levy must be an income tax in the US sense. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(ii) (as amended 2013).
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recovery. 124 In this regard, Congress has outright denied deductions
related to illegal activities, 125 bribes, and kickbacks, 126 implemented
extensive restrictions on the ability to utilize passive losses,127
expanded the scope of the at-risk rules to limit deductions,128
partially disallowed entertainment expenses, 129 disallowed certain
salary expenses, 130 and has outright disallowed certain cross-border
interest expense deductions. 131 Some of these reforms occurred
before the 1983 final regulations were issued while others occurred
after the issuance of the 1983 final regulations. Taken as a whole,
these reforms demonstrate that U.S. tax law has not required that all
significant expenses must be afforded cost recovery; rather, Congress
has chosen to significantly limit or disallow a tax deduction for a
whole range of business expenses in order to ensure that it can tax
the net income in which it wants to tax. 132
With respect to all of these disallowance and limitation regimes,
the courts have allowed Congress discretion to define the net income
that Congress chooses to tax, regardless of whether or not all
significant ordinary and necessary expenses are allowed as a
deduction. Consequently, disallowing foreign tax credit relief when a
foreign country incorporates formulary or presumptive tax principles
is unsupportable given the intervening Supreme Court opinion in
Indopco and given Congress’ continuing actions to disallow cost
recovery when it wants to restrict tax benefits for some larger policy
reason. Once the Supreme Court in Indopco gave a full-throated
endorsement to Congress’s “power to condition, limit, or deny

124. For an analysis of the intended plain meaning of the 1983 final regulations, see the
discussion set forth in Section II.A.1.
125. I.R.C. § 280E (1982); see Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, § 351(a), 96 Stat. 324, 640 (1982).
126. I.R.C. § 162(c); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(b), 83 Stat.
487, 710–11.
127. I.R.C. § 469; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a), 100 Stat.
2085, 2233 (1986).
128. I.R.C. § 465; Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204(a), 90 Stat.
1520, 1531–33 (1976).
129. I.R.C. § 274(n); Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 142(b).
130. I.R.C. § 162(m); Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §
13211(a), 107 Stat. 312, 469–71 (1993).
131. I.R.C. § 163(j); Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §
7210(b)(2), 103 Stat. 2106, 2147 (1989).
132. See Section II.A.1.
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deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net that it
chooses to tax,” 133 the 1983 final regulations became obsolete to the
extent that they require foreign tax levies to allow all significant
deductions in order to be considered an income tax in the
U.S. sense.
4. BEPS challenge to the foreign tax credit regime
The incoherence of the formalistic predominant character
standard set forth in Regulation section 1.901-2(b) becomes clearer
when considering how this standard interacts with the international
tax policy decisions of other nations. In this regard, it is important to
keep in mind that today’s challenge for developed nations is to
defend their tax base against profit shifting and base erosion
strategies of multinational enterprises. 134 The G20 135 and the G-8136
have each expressed concern over how countries should prevent the
artificial shifting of profits to low tax jurisdictions. The OECD has
engaged in a multi-year study137 designed to provide
recommendations on how countries should address this profitshifting phenomenon (the so-called “base erosion and profit
shifting” or “BEPS” project). Source countries are actively designing
tax base defense mechanisms to supplement their income tax
collection efforts. 138
As source countries attempt to defend their tax base from
artificial shifting of income out of their tax base and into low tax
jurisdictions, scholars have increasingly argued that formulary
apportionment principles will be required to prevent artificial profits-

133. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934).
134. See Bret Wells, “Territorial” Tax Reform: Homeless Income is the Achilles Heel, 12
Hous. B. & Tax L.J. 1, 39 (2012).
135. G20, G20 Leaders Declaration, at ¶48, G20 at Los Cabos, Mexico (June 18–19,
2012), https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/G20_Leaders_Decla
ration_Final_Los_Cabos.pdf.
136. Prime Minister’s Office & Cabinet Office, G8 factsheet: tax (html), GOV.UK (June
7, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-factsheet-tax/g8-factsheet-tax.
137. The OECD has established a website to organize the various reports, press releases,
and conference calls, and other activities related to its base erosion and profit shifting initiative
at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm. A discussion of the BEPS project is beyond the scope
of this article, but for further study, see Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV.
55 (2014).
138. See Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at
Source is the Linchpin, 965 TAX L. REV. 535, 599–602 (2012).
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shifting through intercompany arrangements. 139 Thus, it is
foreseeable that countries will increasingly disregard intercompany
transfer pricing agreements and instead choose to exercise their
“power to condition, limit, or deny deductions from gross income in
order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax” 140 to prevent an
inappropriate erosion of their corporate tax base at the hands of
profit-shifting strategies of multinational enterprises.
The introduction of such tax base protection limitations creates
uniquely complex U.S. foreign tax credit issues under the 1983 final
regulations. 141 This foreseeable evolution poses no significant impact
to multinational enterprises incorporated in jurisdictions that do not
attempt to tax extra-territorial business income. But, the thesis of
this Article is that the United States will continue to assert residencybased worldwide taxation (either on a current or deferred basis) on
the extra-territorial income earned by U.S. multinational enterprises,
and as a result, the design challenge for the U.S. government is to
ensure that its foreign tax credit regime is flexible enough to provide
coherent foreign tax credit relief in the midst of these foreseeable
BEPS responses.
International double income taxation should be avoided except
to the extent that denial of foreign tax credit relief represents a
necessary attack on objectionable foreign tax credit transactions. The
formalistic predominant character standard was designed as a
duplicative attack on yesterday’s disguised oil royalty problem, but
these backward looking regulations are ill-suited for the challenging
foreign tax credit issues of today. The continued existence of the
formalistic predominant character standard set forth in the 1983
final regulations creates unnecessary risks of international double
income taxation without a compelling policy reason for doing so (in
fact, there is a compelling policy reason based on competitiveness
reasons
to
minimize
unnecessary
international
double
income taxation).

139. See Reuven Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportionment—Myths and
Prospects, 2011 WORLD TAX J. 371 (2011); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Kimberly Clausing & Michael
Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split,
9 FLA. TAX REV. 497 (2009).
140. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934).
141. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Should the U.S. Dictate World Tax Policy? Reflections on PPL
Corporation v. Commissioner, 138 TAX NOTES INT’L 871 (2013).
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For example, if a country were to adopt a separate thin
capitalization regime as an alternative minimum tax regime, the
“separate levy rule” would require this separate foreign levy to be
individually tested to determine whether this component part of the
income tax law is considered to be an income tax in the U.S. sense.
In prior temporary regulations, the Treasury Department had
provided a comforting example that had favorably dealt with thin
capitalization regimes, 142 but this example was deleted from the 1983
final regulations. 143 Instead of providing guidance in this situation,
the 1983 final regulations state in conclusory fashion that a foreign
tax levy be considered an income tax only in rare circumstances when
such levy disallows significant expenses. The regulations also state
that if significant expenses are disallowed, it must be shown that the
foreign levy will nevertheless be “almost certain to reach some net
gain” notwithstanding the expense disallowance aspects of the
foreign tax levy. 144 Thus, a tax on gross receipts or on gross income
satisfies the net income test only if all significant expenses are
deductible or if the foreign levy is “almost certain to reach some net
gain.” 145 Now that the United States has its own form of thin
capitalization regime, 146 one would hope that a plain textual
interpretation of the net income test set forth in the 1983 final
regulations would not cause a foreign thin capitalization regime to
fail the net income test. However, the 1983 final regulations are
purposely silent on this point. 147
The availability of U.S. foreign tax credit relief, however,
becomes more doubtful under a plain textual reading of the 1983
final regulations if the foreign country adopts an alternative
minimum asset tax regime in lieu of disallowing related party
expenses via a “thin capitalization” regime. In this regard, many
142. Temp. Treas. Reg. §4.901-2(e), Ex. (24) (1980).
143. In the preamble to the final regulations, the Treasury Department explained this
deletion on the grounds that the government wanted to “avoid the possible implication that a
tax that disallowed additional deductions [beyond those set forth in the example] would not
meet the net income test,” but it would have been much preferred if the regulations would
have retained this example and given a further clarifying statement about how foreign country
base protecting measures would be analyzed under these rules. See T.D. 7918, 1983-2
C.B. 113.
144. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(4), (b)(4).
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i)(B) (emphasis added).
146. See § 163(j).
147. See Treas. Reg § 1.901-2.
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Latin American countries have relied on alternative minimum asset
tax regimes to backstop their broad-based general income tax
regime. 148 These countries have viewed asset tax regimes as a
necessary anti-abuse measure to protect against base erosion from
aggressive inbound tax planning. 149 Asset taxes generally range from
0.2% to 2% and indirectly represent a limit on thinly capitalized
companies. 150 Some form of asset tax has been enacted in Argentina,
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. 151 Further, in order to
identify a taxpayer’s net assets, for example, Mexico allows taxpayers
to reduce their net assets by the amount of debt that was payable to
other Mexican non-financial institutions, but does not allow
deduction for cross-border related-party debt. 152 Again, Mexico is
attempting to defend its income tax base against base
erosion strategies. 153
Prior to the 1983 final regulations, a business asset tax enacted
to complement a country’s collection of its general income taxes
would probably have been viewed as a creditable foreign tax under
prior authority. 154 In fact, the Argentine government adopted its
business asset tax only after it received assurance from the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) that the Argentine asset tax
would be creditable in the United States. 155 The Argentine
148. Argentina, 1995 Income and Capital Tax Convention and Final Protocol,
Argentina-Denmark, art. 30, Sep. 4, 1997 96 TNI 234–34, Chile, Phillip R. West, Across the
Great Divide: A Centrist Tax Reform Proposal, 130 TAX NOTES 1025, 1033 (Feb. 28, 2011),
and Peru, William J. Gibbons, Tax Effects of Basing International Business Abroad, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1206, 1249 (1956), have all enacted thin capitalization rules. Thus, perhaps the trend
to use a limitation on interest expense deductions will be a growing trend in Latin America
as well.
149. See, e.g., For Argentina, Dictamen D.A.L. 55/99 (25 June 1999). The theory for an
asset tax is that a business asset should generate at least a minimum level amount of income (a
return on asset) over a reasonable period of time. If this is not the case and the business is
continued, then the assumption must be that there is unreported income. See Bret Wells, TaxEffective Methods to Finance Latin American Operations, 28 INT’L TAX J. 21 (2002).
150. See John McLees, The Business Asset Tax, 93 TAXES NOTES TODAY 175-24 (Sept.
10, 1993).
151. See, e.g., id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Rev. Rul. 67-329, 1967-2 C.B. 257; see also Rev. Rul. 73-117, 1973-1 C.B. 344;
Rev. Rul. 78-62, 1978-1 C.B. 226.
155. Stephen Hodge, Argentine Tax On Minimum Presumed Income, U.S. Foreign Tax
Credit Out of Sync, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 85-39.
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government was later surprised to find out that the IMF’s assurances
that the Argentine asset tax would be entitled to U.S. foreign tax
credit relief were incorrect. 156 With the notable exception of the
United States, a survey of existing worldwide tax treaties reveals a
broad international consensus that asset tax regimes implemented as
part of the overall general income taxes of a foreign country should
be eligible for foreign tax credit relief under bilateral income tax
treaties around the world. 157
156. Id.
157. This is recognized explicitly in many treaties. The Argentina-Spain Tax Treaty Art.
2(3)(b) and Art. 23(1), Mar. 11, 2013, 69 TNI 1128, Doc. 2013-6458; Mexico-Chile Tax
Treaty Art. 2(3)(b)(ii) and Art. 23(1)(1). Agreement between the United Mexican States and
the Republic of Chile for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (with protocol), Mex.-Chile, Apr.
17, 1998, 2484 U.N.T.S. 350; Convention Between the Republic of Venezuela and the Swiss
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, Switz.-Venez., art. 2(3)(b)(ii) & 23, Dec. 23, 1997, 2235 U.N.T.S. 39782 (325);
Convention Between the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Venezuela for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Avoidance and Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Nor.-Venez., art. 2(3)(a)(ii) & 24(2)(a), Oct. 29,
1997, 98 TNI 23-25; Doc 98-4933; Mexico-Denmark Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a)(ii) and Art.
24(2). Convention between the United Mexican States and the Kingdom of Denmark for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital, Mex-Den., Jun. 11, 1997, 97 TNI 217-19, Doc 97-30474;
Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and
Avoidance with Respect to Taxes on Income Between the Republic of Indonesia and the
Republic of Venezuela, Indon.-Venez., art. 2(3)(a) & 23(2), Feb. 27, 1997, 2000 WTD 1635; Doc. 1999-39606; The Finland- Mexico Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a)(ii) and Art. 22(2)(a).
Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the united Mexican States for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income,
Fin.-Mex., Feb. 12, 1997, 2124 U.N.T.S. 295; The Mexico-Venezuela Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)
and Art. 22(3). Convention Between the Republic of Venezuela and the United States of
Mexico for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income, Mex.-Venez., Feb. 6, 1997, 97 TNI 172-22; Doc 97-24843
(states asset taxes of both countries are considered income taxes); Convention Between the
Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad
and Tobago for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and
Avoidance with Respect to Taxes on Income and for the Encouragement of International
Trade and Investment (with protocol), Trin. & Tobago-Venez., art. 2(3)(b) & 23(1), July 31,
1996, 2407 U.N.T.S. 43447 (3); The Venezuela-Czech Republic Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(b)(ii)
and Art. 23(2), April 26, 1996, Doc. 96-30053, 96 TNI 227-29; The Mexico-Italy Tax Treaty
Art. 2(3)(a) and Art. 22(2). Convention between the United Mexican States and the Italian
Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Mex.-It., July 8, 1991, 97 TNI 109-27; Doc 97-16427;
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (with exchange of notes), U.K.-Venez., art.
2(1)(b)(ii) & 22(1)(a), Mar. 11, 1996, 1972 U.N.T.S. 33711 (141); Art. 2(3)(b)(ii) and Art.
23(4) of the Argentina-United Kingdom Tax Treaty; Art. 2(3)(b) (January 3, 1996, 93 TNI
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Even though out-of-step with international norms, the IRS has
ruled that the “separate levy rule” requires an asset tax to be
separately tested. 158 When so tested under the formalistic
predominant character standard set forth in the 1983 final
regulations, such levies fail to qualify for U.S. foreign tax credit relief
because they fail to meet the realization test, the gross receipts test,
and the net income test. 159 Given the broad international consensus
that foreign tax credit relief should be available for alternative
minimum taxes such as asset taxes, the fundamental question is: what
is the U.S. tax policy justification for this incoherent divergence from
this international consensus, particularly when the disallowance of
U.S. foreign tax credit relief subjects U.S. taxpayers to prejudicial
double international income taxation even though no “disguised
royalty problem” is implicated?
251-52, Doc. 96-31575); The Mexico-Norway Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a)(ii) and Art. 24(8).
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Mex.-Nor., Mar. 23, 1995, 1947 U.N.T.S. 166;
The Argentina-Denmark Tax Treaty, Art. 2(3)(b)(ii) and Art. 24(2), December 12, 1995, 96
TNI 234-34, Doc 96-31248; See The Argentina-Canada Tax Treaty, Art. 2(3)(b)(ii) and Art.
23(1)(a), Dec. 30, 1994, 2027 UNTS 407; The Argentina-Finland Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(b)
and Art. 23(1)(a)(ii), December 13, 1994, 96 TNI 30-25; Doc 96-2267; The South KoreaMexico Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a)(ii) and Art. 23(4). Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (with
protocol), S. Kor.-Mex., Oct. 6, 1994, 1873 U.N.T.S. 139; The Netherlands-Mexico Tax
Treaty Art. 2(1)(b) and Art. 22(2). Agreement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (with protocol), Neth.-Mex., Sept. 27, 1993, 2217
U.N.T.S. 105; The Mexico-Germany Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a) and Art. 23(2)(b). Agreement
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital (with
protocol), Mex.-Ger., Feb. 23, 1993, 1764 U.N.T.S. 204; The Mexico-Sweden Tax Treaty
Art. 2(1)(a)(ii) and Art. 22(3). Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (with protocol), Mex.-Swed.,
Sept. 21, 1992, 1719 U.N.T.S. 407; The Spain-Mexico Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(b) and Art.
23(1). Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fraud and
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital (with protocol), Spain-Mex., Jul.
24, 1992, 1832 U.N.T.S. 179; The Mexico-France Tax Treaty Art. 2(2)(b)(ii) and Art.
21(1)(a). Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, Mex.-Fr., Nov. 7, 1991, 1719 U.N.T.S. 330;
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income (with protocol), Can.-Mex. Art. 22(1), Apr. 8, 1991, 1883
U.N.T.S. 350 (349).
158. See Rev. Rul. 91-45, 1991-2 C.B.336.
159. Id. Admittedly, Rev. Rul. 91-45 would allow § 901 relief to apply if the Mexican
asset tax payments were refunded and regular income tax payments were later made, but this
requires the foreign country to carefully craft its asset tax laws; other Latin American countries
with similar asset taxes have not done so, and it is difficult to articulate why they should.
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Another tax base protection device that source countries have
enacted specifically for inbound activities are presumptive tax
regimes. Under a presumptive tax regime, a tax is paid on certain
categories of transactions based on turn-over, gross revenue, 160 or on
net capital gains. Source countries have found it difficult to collect
taxes from offshore investors. In response, several countries have
implemented presumptive tax regimes that impose a reduced tax rate
on the net capital gain or on the gross turnover of a particular
activity as a minimum income tax regime while still retaining their
general income tax regimes. Again, these alternative minimum tax
regimes deal with the practical difficulty of preserving to the source
country a practical means of collecting the expected “right amount”
of income tax while avoiding intractable cross-border transfer
pricing controversies.
Early case law and IRS rulings were supportive of such
“backstop” regimes and generally held that the taxes paid under such
alternative minimum tax regimes would be entitled to U.S. foreign
tax credit relief if they were part of the country’s general income tax
laws and designed to “backstop” the effective collection of the
general income tax of the country. 161 In contrast to the holistic
overall approach utilized in prior case law, the “separate levy rule”
coupled with the three-pronged “predominant character standard”
set forth in the 1983 final regulations requires that these
complimentary regimes be separately tested to determine their
eligibility. When so tested, these minimum tax regimes may fail the
formal design requirements of the three-pronged “predominant
character standard.” 162 Even though the intent of such “backstop”
160. Because cross-border transfer pricing compliance is difficult, Brazil has instituted a
regime that presumes that all related-party exports have at least a presumptive profit margin
and the tax on this presumptive margin is required to be paid. See Yoon Chung Kim and Sonia
Zapata, Taxation in Latin America: Brazil ¶ 5.11(e) (IBFD 2001). This regime attempts to
deal with the base erosion opportunities through a collection mechanism designed to
“backstop” the country’s general income tax laws. In some cases, the “in lieu” provisions of
section 903 may be available to provide relief, but this is only the case where the presumptive
tax regime is in complete substitution for (and not complimentary of) the generally applicable
income tax regime. See § 903; Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1(b)(1) (“a foreign tax satisfies the
substitution requirement if the tax in fact operates as a tax imposed in substitution for, and not
in addition to, an income tax”).
161. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 800 (1926); see Burk Bros. v. Comm’r of I.R.S., 20
B.T.A. 657, 661 (1930).
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i)(B) (2010); Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-1 C.B. 194;
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,087 (Sept. 12, 1979); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,587 (Feb.
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regimes is to collect the “expected right” amount of income tax in a
way that defends against tax base erosions strategies, the three-part
predominant character standard (if faithfully applied) leads to an
incoherent conclusion. These presumptive tax regimes fail to meet
the formalistic net income test set forth in the regulations and thus
are ineligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief except in the limited
situation where the presumptive tax regime represents a complete
substitution 163 (and not simply a complementary regime) for the
foreign country’s general income tax laws.
Perhaps the most significant indictment on the 1983 final
regulations is the fact that the Internal Revenue Service has ignored
these regulations in several recent rounds of guidance on innovative
foreign formulary tax levies that were adopted as part of a foreign
country’s income tax laws. 164 In this regard, Mexico enacted a new
tax in 2008 called the impuesto empresarial a tasa única (IETU) and
repealed the IETU as of January 1, 2014. The main goal of this tax
was to fight tax evasion with Mexico’s underground economy by
requiring companies that do a large amount of business in cash to
pay a 2 percent tax (increased to 3 percent as of January 1, 2010) on
the deposit of currency above MXN 25,000. The IETU’s explicit
goal was to stop tax evasion, so the tax did not target compliant
taxpayers. The IETU was creditable against federal Mexican income
tax. Because this tax did not allow deductions, tax scholars 165 and the
tax practitioner community understood that this tax failed to meet

17, 1976); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-32-003 (May 30, 1995); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9713-001 (Apr. 26, 1995); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2003-31-001 (Apr. 1, 2003). The case law
requires that in order for taxes paid under such complementary tax regimes to be eligible for
U.S. foreign tax credit relief, such tax regimes must be likely to reach net gain. See Bank of
Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 949 (1972); Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 72 (Ct. Cl. 1982). Simplified tax
regimes have represented income taxes in the U.S. sense only when the courts were convinced
that deductions were allowed that compensated for the non-deductibility of significant
business expenses. See Exxon Corp. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 338, 1999 WL 98398 (1999);
Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r, 172 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’g 107 T.C. 51 (1996).
163. Section 903 provides an alternative basis for foreign tax credit relief, but the “in lieu
of” tax must be completely in lieu of any further application of the country’s income tax laws.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1(b)(1).
164. See text accompanying notes 143–52.
165. See David Cameron, PPL: Where’s the Treaty Argument?, 2013 WTD 44-11, Tax.
Doc. 2013-2888 (Mar. 6, 2013).
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the formalistic predominant character standard set forth in the 1983
final regulations. 166
Instead of issuing a ruling that set forth this incoherent result,
the IRS issued Notice 2008-3, 2008-1 C.B. 253, which instead
provided an incoherent rationale. In this ruling, the Internal
Revenue Service said that this tax needed “study” and that “the IRS
will not challenge a taxpayer’s position that the IETU is an income
tax that is eligible for a credit.” The Internal Revenue Service
allowed interim creditability for the IETU without providing any
coherent rationale for how this tax satisfied the three-part standard
set forth in Regulation section 1.901-2(b). The reality was, and is,
that the Internal Revenue Service simply did not want to apply its
own overly formalistic section 901 regulations because doing so
would create an incoherent outcome. However, to achieve this
coherent result the IRS needed to issue a ruling that was devoid of
any coherent rationale.
In 2010, Puerto Rico imposed a formulary excise tax on
multinational enterprises operating in its borders Nevertheless, the
Internal Revenue Service, instead of faithfully applying its existing
1983 final regulations and then applying the completely “in lieu of”
standard of section 903, stated in Notice 2011-29, 2011-16 I.R.B.
663, that the provisions of this excise tax “were novel.” Because this
excise tax qualified as “novel,” the Internal Revenue Service further
stated that “pending resolution of these issues, the IRS will not
challenge a taxpayer’s position that the Excise Tax is a tax in lieu of
an income tax.” Thus, again, without any coherent explanation, the
Internal Revenue Service stated that it would not challenge foreign
tax credit eligibility even though it did not (and in this author’s
opinion could not)167 articulate a coherent rationale for allowing
credit relief. Because the existing foreign tax credit regulations (if
faithfully followed) create incoherent outcomes, these existing
regulations are ill-suited for the issues presented in today’s era. As a
consequence, the IRS is developing a de facto administrative law that
is unsupported by existing regulations.

166. See Randall Jackson, From the Archives: When Is a Foreign Tax Creditable in the
U.S.?, 2014 WTD 248-4, Tax. Doc. 2014-29957 (Dec. 29, 2014).
167. Others have reached the same conclusion. See Martin A. Sullivan, Puerto Rico Shows
Tax Policy at Its Best and Worst, 77 TAX NOTES INT’L 467 (2015); Martin A. Sullivan,
Economic Analysis: The Treasury’s Bailout of Puerto Rico, 73 TAX NOTES INT’L 267 (2014).
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In 2008, the United Kingdom imposed a fixed £30,000 levy on
U.K. non-domiciliary taxpayers. 168 In Rev. Rul. 2011-19, 2011-36
I.R.B. 119, the Internal Revenue Service reached a coherent
outcome by allowing this tax to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit
relief. However, to reach this coherent outcome, the IRS made the
assertion that this levy was likely to reach net income even though it
was a fixed amount and did not provide any deductions. As the press
had reported, this ruling cannot be reconciled with the existing
three-part predominant character standard in Regulation section
1.901-2(b). 169 Even worse, the Internal Revenue Service does not try
to articulate a coherent rationale for how to harmonize this
allowance of foreign tax credit relief with the standards set forth in
its regulatory regime.
On December 10, 2014, the United Kingdom published
proposed legislation that would attempt to assert U.K. taxing
jurisdiction over diverted profits, which the legislation defined as
arrangements that erode the U.K. tax base. 170 The U.K. diverted
profits tax applies when there is not a U.K. permanent establishment
or when U.K. origin profits, under transfer pricing arrangements, are
shifted to offshore entities that pay low amounts of tax and lack of
economic substance in their country of residence. 171 This legislation
became effective on April 1, 2015. 172
This proposed diverted profits legislation is designed to protect
the U.K. corporate tax base from base erosion and profit shifting
techniques of multinational enterprises, but does so by disallowing
some substantial business expenditures. Thus, this diverted profits
legislation attempts to ensure that income taxes on net income
derived in the United Kingdom are taxed in the United Kingdom,
but this regime is unlikely to meet the formalistic predominant
character standard in the 1983 final regulations because it does not
guarantee that all substantial business expenses are entitled to cost

168. Notice 2011-29.
169. See Lee A. Sheppard, Does the U.K. Diverted Profits Tax Qualify for the Foreign Tax
Credit, 146 TAX NOTES 159 (Jan. 12, 2015).
170. See HM Revenue & Customs, Overview of Legislation in Draft at 14 (Dec. 10,
2014), available at Tax. Doc. 2014-29148.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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recovery. 173 But again, as the IRS has now repeatedly ignored its own
regulations, it is uncertain what it will do with respect to this new
measure. The U.K. diverted profits legislation is clearly aimed at
defending the U.K. income tax base by “conditioning, limiting, or
denying deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net
that [the U.K.] chooses to tax.” 174 Recent news reports indicate that
other countries are considering similar diverted profits measures to
protect their income tax base from the BEPS phenomenon.175
Viewed in its totality, these recent developments demonstrate that
the formalistic predominant character standard set forth in the 1983
final regulations is ill-suited to address innovative legislation and thus
poses a serious risk that U.S. multinational enterprises would be
unable to obtain U.S. foreign tax credit relief.
Consequently this analysis underscore the current reality: the
formalistic predominant character 176 standard in the 1983 final
regulations is ill-suited for providing coherent outcomes given how
other countries are designing their tax systems to address the
BEPS phenomenon.
5. Final reassessment of the formalistic predominant character
standard (not good)
For the reasons set forth in the preceding sections, the Treasury
Department should amend Regulation section 1.901-2(b) to replace
the predominate character standard with a more holistic approach
that is consistent with the pre-1983 case law. The historic rationale
for infusing formal requirements into the regulatory predominant
character standard is adequately addressed by Regulation section

173. See Lee A. Sheppard, Does the U.K. Diverted Profits Tax Qualify for the Foreign Tax
Credit, 146 TAX NOTES 159 (Jan. 12, 2015). But see Philip Wagman, The U.K. Diverted
Profits Tax: Selected U.S. Tax Considerations, 147 TAX NOTES 1413 (June 22, 2015) (although
recognizing that the law is unsettled, the author argues that “[i]t might be argued that the
[U.K. diverted profits tax] authorization of recharacterizations in which related-party
deductions are denied, in circumstances suggesting possible inappropriate base stripping,
represents a reasonable limit on deductions for costs and expenses that is reasonable under the
section 901 regulations”).
174. See text accompanying note 133.
175. Mindy Herzfeld, PEs and FTCs: Who Wins, Who Loses?, 2015 WTD 80-1, Tax Doc.
2015-9705 (Apr. 27, 2015).
176. See generally Ryan Finley, Treasury Undecided on Creditability of U.K. Diverted
Profits Tax, 2015 TNT 207-6, Tax. Doc. 2015-23734 (Oct. 27, 2015).
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1.901-2A without the need for further complexity. 177 In addition, the
Court’s reinterpretation of the standard in the PPL case places a
heavy judicial gloss on the 1983 final regulations to harmonize them
with prior case law when, in fact, the intended plain meaning of the
1983 final regulations was to supplant the more holistic analysis of
pre-1983 case law. 178 Moreover, the 1983 final regulations articulate
a net income standard that is inconsistent with how the U.S. income
tax laws have been characterized by the Supreme Court’s Indopco
decision where the Court stated that the taxpayer did not need to be
afforded a deduction for all substantial expenditures in order to
clearly reflect income in the U.S. sense. 179 And, worse yet, the
Internal Revenue Service has issued public guidance that side-steps
the need to apply the government’s own regulations, thus creating
an administrative working law that is incoherent, unexplained, and
irreconcilable with the existing 1983 final regulations. Each of these
examples points to an irreconcilable conflict: to achieve a “coherent
outcome” in important fact patterns, Regulation section 1.901-2(b)
cannot be applied in a “coherent manner” because this regulation (if
literally applied) logically leads to incoherent and unjust outcomes.
It is now time for the Treasury Department to issue new
regulatory guidance so that its section 901 regulations provide a
standard that, when transparently applied, affords coherent foreign
tax credit outcomes. The existing 1983 final regulations are
inflexible, ignored by the government, and were reinterpreted by the
Supreme Court in PPL in a “substance over form” manner to afford
coherent outcomes. These regulations need to be revised to
eliminate unnecessary uncertainty and unhelpful controversy.
Regulation section 1.901-2(b) represents a look backwards to
yesterday’s disguised oil royalty problem when these regulations
instead should be forward-looking to address the foreign tax credit
eligibility standards that are appropriate for a world where formulary
or presumptive tax protection measures are likely to be embedded
within the country’s income tax laws. Given that the United States
needs its foreign tax credit regime to appropriately mesh with the

177. Professor Coven urged the Treasury Department to remove this requirement fifteen
years ago, and the PPL decision only adds more force to that argument. See Coven, supra note
49, at 127.
178. For the rationale of these formalistic changes, see the discussion in Section II.A.1.
179. Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
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foreign tax regimes of other nations, the Treasury Department
should immediately open a regulatory project to rewrite Regulation
section 1.901-2(b) so that the faithful application of the
government’s foreign tax credit regulations does not result in
disallowing U.S. foreign tax credit relief for foreign income taxes
that are paid in non-objectionable situations.
Because the Treasury Department redundantly solved the
disguised oil royalty problem with its dual capacity taxpayer
regulations contained in Regulation section 1.901-2A, the section
907 limitation regime also has become redundant as it tries to attack
the already adequately addressed disguised oil royalty problem in
another manner. 180 Therefore, Congress should repeal section 907 as
its legitimate concerns have already been addressed by the Treasury
Department through the issuance of the dual capacity taxpayer
regulations of section 1.901-2A. The cross-crediting concerns raised
by high extraction taxes needed a response, but generated three
redundant responses. Now is the time to remove the needless
complexity of the extra two responses, which include the formalistic
aspects of the predominant character standard and the specialized
section 907 limitation regime that applies to extraction taxes.
B. Blitzkrieg Against Compaq-Style Financial Arbitrage Transactions
In the 1990s, the government’s war on objectionable foreign tax
credit transactions moved away from extraction taxes and settled into
a fight over the cross-crediting of excess foreign tax credits generated
by abusive financial arbitrage transactions. In Notice 98-5, the
government expressed strong hostility toward taxpayer attempts to
cross-credit taxes generated in abusive financial arbitrage transactions
and identified five transactions of interest to discuss the contours of
its policy concerns. 181 The Treasury Department argued that each of
the five transactions of interest set forth in Notice 98-5 lacked
economic substance because they made no sense apart from their
generation of U.S. foreign tax credit benefits. When a transaction
only has an economic justification when considering the U.S. tax
savings from excess U.S. foreign tax credits, then the transaction
does not have a sufficient non-tax business purpose, at least

180. See supra note 46.
181. 1998-1 C.B. 334, withdrawn by Notice 2004-19, 2004-1 C.B. 606.
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according to Notice 98-5. Again, the fundamental point is that the
government signaled a willingness to restrict foreign tax credit
eligibility standards as a means to attack the cross-crediting of excess
credits generated from “objectionable transactions.” Section 904,
which was designed in 1921 to handle the cross-crediting
phenomenon, was perceived as ill-suited for the abusive transaction
of concern.
The formulation of the economic substance doctrine set forth in
Notice 98-5 was challenged in Compaq Computer v. Commissioner.182
Compaq had recognized a long-term capital gain of approximately
$232 million. 183 Upon learning of this capital gain, an investment
banker structured a series of financial transactions that allowed
Compaq to purchase ten million Royal Dutch ADRs for
approximately $887.6 million cum-dividend, and to sell these shares
ex-dividend for approximately $868.4 million. 184 Compaq, using the
“next-day” settlement rules, settled the purchase-trades on
September 17, 1992. 185 However, for the sale-trades, Compaq used
regular settlement rules and settled the sales-portion of the
transaction on September 21, 1992. 186 As a result of the difference in
settlement dates, Compaq was the owner of ten million Royal Dutch
ADRs on the dividend record date of September 18 and thus was
entitled to receive a dividend of approximately $22.5 million. 187 The
Dutch withholding taxes on this dividend were approximately $3.4
million, so Compaq actually received a net dividend of $19.1
million. 188 Compaq also incurred transaction costs on the trades
totaling $1.5 million. 189 Thus, the transaction (which was completed
in approximately one hour) created a net cash loss of approximately
$1.6 million to Compaq as follows:
IRS
Position

Compaq
Position

182. Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 785 (5th Cir. 2001), rev’g 113
T.C. 214 (1999); see IES Indus. v. U.S., 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001) (same).
183. Compaq Comput. Corp., 113 T.C. at 215.
184. Id. at 217–18.
185. Id. at 218.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 219.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 221.
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ADR Sale Price

$868.40

Investment Banker
Fees
ADR Purchase Price

<$1.5>
<$887.6>

Capital Loss
Dividend (Gross of
$22.5 less $3.4
withholding)
Negative Cash
Flow
Pre-Tax Net
Income
Foreign
Withholding
Taxes

<$20.7>

<$20.7>

$19.1 Net
dividend

$22.5
Gross
Dividend

<$1.6>
$1.8
<$3.4>

Regarding the above facts, the Tax Court denied foreign tax
credit relief because the financial arbitrage transaction lacked an
adequate non-tax business purpose due to the fact that Compaq’s
trades were pre-wired, created a negative cash flow of $1.6 million,
and were done solely to generate $3.4 million of U.S. foreign tax
credits. 190 The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision,
agreeing with Compaq that the gross dividend is used to determine
whether there was a pre-tax profit motive and concluding that a pretax profit was the only prerequisite for the transaction to have an
adequate business purpose and possess economic substance. 191 Thus,
according to the Fifth Circuit, as long as Compaq possessed a pre-tax

190. Id. at 222, 225. The Tax Court used the economic substance doctrine to deny U.S.
foreign tax credit benefits in this transaction, claiming that Compaq failed to possess a
sufficient non-tax business purpose and was motivated solely by the desire to obtain U.S.
foreign tax credit benefits. In the course of its opinion, the Tax Court reasoned as follows:
The foreign tax credit serves to prevent double taxation and to facilitate
international business transactions. No bona fide business is implicated here, and we
are not persuaded that Congress intended to encourage or permit a transaction such
as the ADR transaction, which is merely a manipulation of the foreign tax credit to
achieve U.S. tax savings.
Compaq Comput. Corp, 113 T.C. at 225.
191. The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s application of the economic substance
doctrine, reasoning that Compaq’s economic profit is to be judged by looking at its pre-tax
gross dividend and stating that foreign income taxes should not be considered as an expense,
thus rejecting Notice 98-5’s interpretation of the economic substance doctrine. Compaq
Comput. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2001), rev’g 113 T.C. 214 (1999); see
also IES Indus. v. U.S., 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
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profit ($1.8 million in the above table), it was irrelevant that this
pre-tax profit suffered a pre-planned effective foreign tax rate of
189% (or $3.4 million in the above table). 192
As cases such as Compaq were making their way to the
courthouse, Congress enacted section 901(k) in 1997 to require a
minimum holding period as a precondition to claiming U.S. foreign
tax credit relief for dividend withholding taxes. 193 However, it
192. The government withdrew Notice 98-5 after its defeat in Compaq. See Notice 200419, 2004-1 C.B. 606 (withdrawing Notice 98-5). The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Compaq was
the subject of significant criticism by scholars. See Michael Schler, Implicit Taxes and Economic
Substance (letter to the editor), 114 TAX NOTES 959 (Mar. 5, 2007); Michael Knoll, Implicit
Taxes and Pretax Profit in Compaq and IES Industries, 114 TAX NOTES 679 (Feb. 12, 2007);
Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Other’ Issues When a Tax Case Goes to Court, 101 TAX
NOTES 1097 (Dec. 1, 2003); Bryan Camp, Form over Substance in the Fifth Circuit, 34 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 733, 752–62 (2003); Nicholas Gunther, Economics and Compaq v.
Commissioner, 97 TAX NOTES 555, 555 (Oct. 28, 2002); William A. Klein & Kirk J. Stark,
Compaq v. Commissioner-Where Is the Tax Arbitrage?, 106 TAX NOTES 1335 (Mar. 7, 2002);
Martin J. McMahon Jr., Economic Substance, Purposive Activity, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 94
TAX NOTES 1017, 1018 (Feb. 25, 2002); Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth
Circuit Gets it Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 26 TAX NOTES INT’L 191, 192 (Jan. 28,
2002); David P. Hariton, The Compaq Case, Notice 98-5, and Tax Shelters: The Theory is All
Wrong, 94 TAX NOTES 501 (Jan. 28, 2002); Symposium, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality:
Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 SMU L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2001); Daniel Shaviro, Economic
Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 231–32 (July 9,
2000); Marc D. Teitelbaum, Compaq Computer and IES Industries—The Empire Strikes Back,
86 TAX NOTES 829 (Feb 7, 2000); Dana L. Trier, Beyond the Smell Test: The Role of Substantive
Anti-Avoidance Rules in Addressing the Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, TAXES, 62, 65–70
(2000); Marc D. Teitelbaum, An Alternative Analysis of the Compaq Decision (letter to the
editor), 85 TAX NOTES 816 (Nov. 11, 1999); George K. Yin, Making Sense of the Compaq
Computer Case (letter to the editor), 85 TAX NOTES 815 (Nov. 8, 1999); Raby & Raby,
Economic Substance Needed for Foreign Tax Credit, 85 TAX NOTES 211 (Oct. 11, 1999); Lee A.
Sheppard, Courts Combat Cross-Border Tax Shelters, 85 TAX NOTES 137 (Oct. 11, 1999);
David. P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW 235 (1999).
193. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 1053(a), 111 Stat. 788 (1997). When Congress originally
enacted I.R.C. § 901(k) in 1997, it required the taxpayer to hold the stock for at least sixteen
days within a thirty-day period that included the dividend record date. Congress amended
I.R.C. § 901(k) to change the thirty-day period to a thirty-one-day period. Pub. L. No. 108311, 406(g)(1), 118 Stat. 1166 (2004). Compaq attempted to dissuade the Tax Court from
applying the judicially-created economic substance doctrine by arguing that Congress enacted
I.R.C. § 901(k) as the limited response to these tax arbitrage transactions. The taxpayer made
these statutory construction arguments even though the legislative history made clear that in
its enactment of I.R.C. § 901(k) that “[n]o inference is intended as to the treatment under
present law of tax-motivated transactions intended to transfer foreign tax credit benefits,” See
S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 177 (1997). Compaq’s argument, however, was as follows:
Congress acknowledged the economic substance of the dividend arbitrage
transaction, and used a legislative scalpel to address the perceived concern, rather
than the judicial hatchet wielded by the Commissioner and the Tax Court. The Tax
Court’s holding, if affirmed by this Court, would override the results mandated by
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excepted certain foreign-licensed securities dealers from these
holding period requirements. 194 The legislative history to section
901(k) shows that Congress’ concern was that tax-motivated
transactions were occurring to transfer foreign tax credits in the
marketplace in short-term trades. 195 In 2004, Congress added section
901(l) to impose a similar holding period requirement for
instruments that incur interest withholding taxes, but again excepted
securities dealers from these new requirements. 196 Thus, even though

Congress in section 901(k). Given that Congress has addressed the precise issue
before the Court, it is particularly appropriate for the Court to decline the
Commissioner’s invitation to judicially modify the foreign tax credit regime in the
name of economic substance. See Brown Group, 77 F.3d at 222. The Congressional
response to the dividend arbitrage transaction in section 901(k) confirms the
economic substance of Compaq’s Royal Dutch dividend arbitrage transaction.
Brief of Appellant at 36, Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Comm’r, No. 00-60648 at 36 (5th Cir.
2001). The Tax Court rejected this argument. Compaq Comput. Corp., 113 T.C. at 225–26
(“A transaction does not avoid economic substance scrutiny because the transaction predates a
statute targeting the specific abuse”). But, the Fifth Circuit left this issue unaddressed in the
course of reversing the Tax Court notwithstanding the clear statement in the legislative history
that no inference should have been drawn from the enactment of I.R.C. § 901(k) as to the
applicability of other doctrines to this transaction. Compaq Comput. Corp., 277 F.3d at 788
(“It is unnecessary to reach the alternative arguments for reversal offered by Compaq: first,
that the statutory foreign tax credit regime implicitly displaces the economic substance
doctrine; and second, that a 1997 amendment to the foreign tax credit scheme, which added
what is now Internal Revenue Code § 901(k), implies that ADR transactions that took place
before the amendment are to be recognized for tax purposes.”). This episode serves as a
warning that incomplete and ad hoc policy reforms can make things worse.
194. I.R.C. § 901(k)(4) (2010). Commentators indicated that this exception represented
a compromise that allowed securities dealers to continue to benefit from these foreign tax
credit-generating transactions, but excluded the retail user from these techniques. See Lee A.
Sheppard, “What Did Wall Street Give Up for Deferral?” 76 TAX NOTES 1665 (Sept. 29,
1997). However, section 901(k)(4) does not exclude a securities dealer unless it is held to be
in active conduct in a foreign country as a securities dealer, a requirement that may prevent
US-based securities dealers from being eligible for this exception. See Lehman Bros. Holdings,
Inc. v. U.S., No. 10 Civ. 6200(RMB), 2015 WL 2359256, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2015).
195. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 545 (1997) (“[S]ome U.S. persons have engaged in
tax-motivated transactions designed to transfer foreign tax credits from persons that are unable
to benefit from such credits . . . to persons that can use such credits. These transactions
sometimes involve a short-term transfer of ownership of dividend-paying shares. Other
transactions involve the use of derivatives to allow a person that cannot benefit from the
foreign tax credits with respect to a dividend to retain the economic benefit of the dividend
while another person receives the foreign tax credit benefits.”); S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 175-6
(1997) (same); Juliann Avakian Martin, Foreign Tax Credit Holding Period Proposal Generates
Comment, 75 TAX NOTES 1038 (May 26, 1997).
196. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 832, 118 Stat. 1588
(2004) (adding new § 901(l)); see also H.R. REP. NO. No. 108-755, at 621 (Oct. 7, 2004)
(Conf. Rep.) (adopting version of the house bill); H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, at 201 (June 16,
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Congress failed to address the fundamental tax arbitrage aspects of
the Compaq transaction and the new minimum holding period
requirements had selective application, these provisions demonstrate
an attempt to deny foreign tax credit relief for objectionable shortterm financial arbitrage transactions that were executed by
retail customers.
In the end, Congress’s codification of the economic substance
doctrine reversed the holdings of cases like Compaq and IES in that
section 7701(o)(2)(B) explicitly directed the Treasury Department
to issue regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as expenses
in order to calculate the reasonably expected pre-tax profit potential
of a transaction. 197
Thus, the remedy for the foreign tax credit generator
transactions set forth in Notice 98-5 was legislatively codified in the
enactment of section 7701(o)(2)(B), and specific authority was given
to the Treasury Department to handle these objectionable
transactions in a targeted manner under the codified economic
substance doctrine. By directing the Treasury Department to issue
regulations that would treat a foreign tax payment as a transactional
expense, section 7701(o)(2)(B) sets forth a pre-tax profit test that
coherently and holistically addresses the cross-crediting concerns of

2004) (“The Committee believes that the present-law holding period requirement for claiming
foreign tax credits with respect to dividends is too narrow in scope and, in general, should be
extended to apply to items of income or gain other than dividends, such as interest.”). The
determination of what risk mitigation strategies create a tolling of the holding period creates
considerable complexity in the application of this law. Nicholas Bogos, A Risk-Based Analysis of
Credit Derivation Under SSRP Standard (Part 1), 112 TAX NOTES 587 (Aug. 14, 2006);
(Part 2), 112 TAX NOTES 655 (Aug. 21, 2006); (Part 3), 112 TAX NOTES 259 (Aug.
28, 2006).
197. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(2)(A)(B) set forth the following criteria for analyzing
whether a pre-tax profit potential is substantial enough to satisfy economic substance concerns:
(2) SPECIAL RULE WHERE TAXPAYER RELIES ON PROFIT POTENTIAL—
(A) IN GENERAL—The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken
into account in determining whether the requirements of subparagraphs (A)
and (B) of paragraph (1) are met with respect to the transaction only if the
present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is
substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that
would be allowed if the transaction were respected.
(B) TREATMENT OF FEES AND FOREIGN TAXES—Fees and other
transaction expenses shall be taken into account as expenses in determining
pre-tax profit under subparagraph (A). The Secretary shall issue regulations
requiring foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in determining pre-tax profit
in appropriate cases.
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these abusive financial arbitrage transactions where the overall
transaction creates a cash loss to the taxpayer. Ultimately section
901(k) and 901(l), along with their various scope limitations, 198 now
produce needless complexity. With the enactment of section
7701(o)(2)(B), Congress should repeal sections 901(k) and (l)
because the policy concerns that motivated their adoption are more
appropriately solved by section 7701(o)(2)(B) without the notable
favorable exceptions granted to securities dealers.
C. STARS War: The Government Strikes Back (Again)
The foreign tax credit war shifted to a more sophisticated
variation in what the government came to call a structured passive
investment arrangement. As indicated in the preceding section, the
financial arbitrage transactions in Compaq and IES were uneconomic
except for the tax credit benefits generated in those overall
transactions. Thus, those are easy cases from an economic substance
and business purpose perspective, despite the fact that the courts
failed to arrive at the right answer and caused Congress to enact
section 7701(o)(2)(B) in response.
However, the next generation of financial arbitrage transactions
proved to be substantially more complex while still presenting the
same fundamental cross-crediting phenomenon. Unlike Compaq and
IES, the highly structured financial arbitrage transactions that utilize
a structured passive investment arrangement 199 often generate an
overall pre-tax profit even if the foreign tax cost is treated as an
expense in the transaction. From an overall perspective, the entire
transaction has a business purpose and makes overall economic sense.
However, the problematic aspect of these structured passive
investment arrangements centers on the fact that the transaction step
that bolts-on a passive investment vehicle to an otherwise profitable
transaction is extraneous to the underlying investment assets.
On one hand, the bolting-on of this passive investment vehicle to
conduct the transaction, though extraneous, provides some
incremental pre-tax borrowing savings to the U.S. taxpayer.
However, it also results in the U.S. taxpayer incurring a substantially
larger incremental foreign tax cost that far exceeds the incremental

198. See I.R.C. § 901(k)(4); § 901(l)(2).
199. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv).
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borrowing savings generated by the bolting-on of this otherwise
extraneous passive investment vehicle. 200 Thus, if the transaction step
bolted-on to the larger transaction were isolated and separately
tested as an independent business decision, the additional step would
have no justifiable business purpose—its addition would be solely tax
motivated. Said differently, the addition of this otherwise extraneous
transaction step creates incremental financial benefits that are less
than the incremental foreign tax cost incurred as a result of its
addition. Importantly, in these structured passive investment
arrangements, the taxpayer knows upfront that the incremental
savings in borrowing cost arising from the inclusion of the otherwise
extraneous transaction step will be less than (and often only half of)
the amount of the incremental additional foreign tax cost incurred
by the inclusion of the transaction step. 201
Prior to the enactment of section 7701(o), the Treasury
Department was unsure of its prospects for victory against such
structures, and so, yet again, it amended its section 901 regulations
to attack this new generation of foreign tax credit generator
transactions. 202 In so doing, the Treasury Department added further
redundant complexity and clutter to the already complex regulatory
framework of section 901. In this regard, the Treasury Department

200. The structures vary, but the essential facts are that a foreign lender invests in a
foreign subsidiary. For foreign tax purposes, the foreign lender is treated as a stockholder and
is entitled to be exempt on the income from its stock investment in its resident jurisdiction.
The foreign lender is willing to accept a lower return than would be required if the foreign
lender made a straight taxable-interest-bearing loan. Because foreign law treats the payments
to the foreign lender as a dividend, the structured passive investment arrangement does not
allow the foreign subsidiary to deduct its payments to the foreign lender for foreign tax
purposes. The incremental additional tax cost due to the foregone interest expense deduction
is about twice as much as the reduced borrowing cost. Thus, if one were to view the addition
of this bolt-on structured passive investment arrangement in isolation, the pre-tax benefits are
significantly less than the foreign tax cost of engaging in this structure. But, the ability to
cross-credit the foreign taxes against other low tax income makes the transaction economical.
201. See e.g., Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543, 561 (2013), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Bx payment, or interest rebate, was
equal to 51% of the foreign tax cost); see also Expert Report of Michael I. Cragg at ¶ 76; Salem
Fin., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543, 561 (2013), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 786
F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
202. See T.D. 9535, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,038 (July 18, 2011) (finalized in final regulations
the regulatory rules for structured passive investment arrangements); T.D. 9416, 73 Fed. Reg.
40,727 (July 16, 2008) (made amendments to regulations in unrelated areas); Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,081 (Mar. 30, 2007) (announced special rules for
structured passive investment arrangements in proposed regulations).
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created a rifle-short provision in Regulation section 1.9012(e)(5)(iv) that treats any tax payment made as part of a structured
passive investment arrangement as a “voluntary” (non-compulsory)
foreign tax payment. By classifying taxes generated in a structured
passive investment arrangement as “voluntary,” these taxes fail to
meet the basic requirement of a “foreign tax” as a foreign tax must
be a compulsory, rather than voluntary, payment in order to be
eligible under section 901 for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. 203 In its
attack on these structures, the Treasury Department provided a
highly stylized set of factors that must be satisfied before an
investment structure would be classified as a “structured passive
investment arrangement.” 204
Because these regulations did not seek to weigh the tax and nontax benefits of such structured passive investment arrangements, and
because this regulatory prescription only applies to structures that
met a formal six-part test, several comments were submitted to the
Treasury Department. The comments stated that these regulations
were under-inclusive because they did not address objectionable
foreign tax credit benefits generated in analogous abusive structures,
and yet were also over-inclusive because the regulations could
disallow foreign tax credit relief even if the structured investment
had a significant non-tax purpose.205 The comments went on to state
that the better means of attacking these structured passive

203. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv); T.D. 9416, 73 FED. REG. 40,727 (July 16,
REG.
67,387
(Nov.
14,
2008).
2008),
corrected
in
73
FED.
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/N135C78F0167C11E3B490C480DE6B7DD7/Vie
w/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.Search)&userEnteredCita
tion=Treas.+Reg.+1.901-2.
204. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv)(B) (setting forth six detailed criteria that must
be met which in general are as follows: (i) a special purpose vehicle, (ii) a U.S. party exists who
is eligible for foreign tax credit relief, (iii) direct investment is made, (iv) foreign tax credit
benefit exists to a counterparty, (v) a foreign counterparty exists, and (vi) the U.S. party and
foreign counterparty have inconsistent tax treatment). https://1.next.westlaw.com/
Document/N135C78F0167C11E3B490C480DE6B7DD7/View/FullText.html?transitionT
ype=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.Search)&userEnteredCitation=Treas.+Reg.+1.901-2.
205. See Kevin Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit Generator Regs: The Purple People Eater
Returns, 115 TAX NOTES 1155 (June 18, 2007); Comment Letter by Kevin Dolan (May 31,
2007), available at 2007 TNT 107-52, Tax Analyst Doc. 2007-13277; Comment Letter by
Bret Wells (Aug. 6, 2007), available at TAX NOTES TODAY, 2007 TNT 160-10, Tax Analyst
Doc. 2007-18951.
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investment arrangements would have been to utilize the economic
substance doctrine. 206 However, these comments were ignored. 207
Although the STARS transactions 208 have created a spirited
debate about their effectiveness under the law prior to section
7701(o)’s enactment, 209 the enactment of that section effectively
ends that controversy. Section 7701(o) gives the government all the
tools that it needs to deny foreign tax credit relief for foreign taxes
generated in these so-called STARS transactions. 210 An analysis of the
key taxpayer arguments in the STARS cases and determining how
those arguments would fare under the codified economic substance
doctrine set forth in section 7701(o) confirms this conclusion.
First, the taxpayers in the STARS cases argued that the economic
substance doctrine should be applied to test only the business
purpose for the overall transaction and not a component feature of
an integrated transaction that has an overall business purpose. 211 The
government has largely succeeded in convincing lower courts to
apply the judicially created economic substance doctrine on a
disaggregated basis in the STARS transactions such that the
investment returns that would have been earned regardless of the tax
structure will not cause a cash negative bolt-on structure to possess a

206. Id.
207. See T.D. 9535, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,038 (July 18, 2011).
208. One of the tax products that utilized a structured passive investment vehicle was
commonly called a “STARS” transaction. To appropriately address the literature that deals
with that specific context, the author refers specifically to that acronym even though the
regulatory description of that transaction is a structured passive investment arrangement.
209. See Kevin Dolan, The Foreign Tax Credit Diaries—Litigation Run Amok, 140 TAX
NOTES 1465 (2013); Jasper Cummings, Jr., The Economic Substance Doctrine as Penalty, 138
TAX NOTES 1465 (2013); Richard Lipton, BNY and AIG—Using Economic Substance to
Attack Transactions the Courts Do Not Like, 119 J. TAX’N 40 (July 2013); Lee Sheppard, Can
the FTC Generator Decisions Be Reconciled? 141 TAX NOTES 451 (Nov. 4, 2013); Lee
Sheppard, Foreign Tax Credit Generator Disallowed, 133 TAX NOTES 400 (Oct. 24, 2011); Lee
Sheppard, Banks’ Foreign Tax Credit Arbitrage, Part 3, 116 TAX NOTES 824 (Sept. 3, 2007);
Lee Sheppard, Banks’ Foreign Tax Credit Arbitrage, Part 2, 115 TAX NOTES 99 (Apr. 9,
2007); Lee Sheppard, Banks’ Foreign Tax Credit Arbitrage, 2006 TNT 137-4 (July 18, 2006).
210. Evidently, the acronym STARS was the acronym used by the promoter of these
passive investment trust structures and stands for Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged
Securities transaction. See Bank of New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15, 16−17 (2013)
(where Tax Court indicates the acronym and its origin).
211. See, e.g., Appellant Brief at 22, 42–56, Bank of New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 2014
WL 2799053 (June 12, 2014); Appellant Brief at 38–40, American Int’l Group v. United
States, 2014 WL 3402503 (June 30, 2014).
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sufficient business purpose for its inclusion. 212 Whether or not this
success continues, section 7701(o)(5)(D) explicitly rejects the
taxpayers’ argument by stating that the economic substance doctrine
can be applied to an individual transaction step to determine the
independent business purpose and economic substance of the
particular transaction step that generates U.S. tax benefits. 213 Thus,
in years where section 7701(o)(5)(D) is effective, taxpayers will not
be able to argue that a bolt-on extraneous tax strategy can benefit
from being part of a larger transaction that has an overall
business purpose.
The second key taxpayer argument in the STARS cases is that
foreign taxes should not be considered an expense in determining
whether the transaction possesses a pre-tax profit motive a la Compaq
and IES. 214 Section 7701(o)(2)(B) explicitly repudiates this position
212. See Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543 (2013). The U.S. Court of
Federal Claims disallowed deductions and credits generated in BB&T’s participation in a
STARS transaction by testing the trust structure as a separate step. Id. The court stated as
follows:
The trust creates a series of instantaneous circular cash flows starting and ending with
BB & T where no economic activity has occurred abroad to justify the assessment of a
U.K. tax. While inarguably sophisticated and creative, the trust purely and simply is a
sham transaction accomplishing nothing more than a redirection of cash flows that
should have gone to the U.S. Treasury, but instead are shared among BB & T,
Barclays, and the U.K. Treasury. The Court finds that the trust component of STARS
lacks economic substance.
Aff’d in part and rev’d in part and remanded, Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, No. 20145027, 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, Sup. Ct. Dk. No. 15-380 (2016); Bank of
New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15 (2013), supplemented by T.C. Memo. 2013-225
(2013) (found that the STARS transaction lacked economic substance by separately testing the
business purpose and economic substance of the passive investment trust in the structure,
stating that “the relevant transaction to be tested is the one that produces the disputed tax
benefit, even if it is part of a larger set of transactions or steps” and that “the requirements of
the economic substance doctrine are not avoided simply by coupling a routine transaction with
a transaction lacking economic substance.” ); Am. Int’l Grp. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R. 2d
2013-1472 (D.C.N.Y. 2013) (holding that use of the structured investment vehicle had no
economic substance or business purpose). But see Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. U.S., 977
F. Supp. 2d 46 (D. Mass. 2013) (refusing to disaggregate the STARS transaction to test the
economic substance of the transaction step and instead found economic substance given the
profitability of the overall transaction).
213. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(D); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG.,
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE RECONCILIATION ACT OF
2010, as amended, in combination with the PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT, at 153 (2010).
214. See, e.g., Appellant Brief at 37–42, Bank of New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 2014 WL
2799053 (June 12, 2014); Appellant Brief at 40–49, American Int’l Grp. v. United States,
2014 WL 3402503 (June 30, 2014).
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by directing the Treasury Department to issue regulations to treat
foreign taxes as an expense as part of the assessment of the nontax
profit motive of the taxpayer.
The combination of section 7701(o)’s two clarifications,
therefore, requires courts to analyze the transaction step that
generates excess foreign tax credits in isolation and to view any
foreign taxes as an expense to determine the profit motive of this
isolated step. Courts applying this methodology to STARS
transactions, should find that the incremental foreign tax cost
incurred as a result of the inclusion of the structured passive
investment vehicle far exceeds the incremental expected savings in
borrowing costs derived by including this structured passive
investment vehicle into the overall investment strategy. Regardless of
how these STARS cases are ultimately resolved under the judicially
created economic substance doctrine, 215 the litigating position of the
taxpayer in those cases makes it clear that section 7701(o) should
disallow the tax credits generated in the STARS-type transaction in
years where the codified version of the economic substance
doctrine applies. 216

215. Taxpayers in several of these cases have petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear
these cases. See, e.g., American Int’l Grp. v. United States, petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 13,
2015) (No. 15-478); Mellon Bank of New York v. Comm.’r., petition for cert. filed, (Nov. 2,
2015) (No. 15-572); Salem Financial v. United States, petition for cert. filed, (Sept. 29, 2015)
(No. 15-380), cert. denied, (Mar. 7, 2016). However, the U.S. Supreme Court refused
certiorari in these cases, thus letting the lower court victories in these cases stand.
216. In the legislative history to I.R.C. § 7701(o), it was stated that routine business
transactions such as “(1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise with debt or
equity; (2) a U.S. person’s choice between utilizing a foreign corporation or a domestic
corporation to make a foreign investment; (3) the choice to enter a transaction or series of
transactions that constitute a corporate organization or reorganization under subchapter C;
and (4) the choice to utilize a related-party entity in a transaction, provided that the arm’s
length standard of I.R.C. § 482 and other applicable concepts are satisfied.” See STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF
THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT at 379 (2011). As has been pointed out by
Professor Luke, this legislative history provides two caveats to reliance on this safe harbor list:
“(1) whether a particular transaction meets the requirements for specific treatment under any
of these provisions can be a question of facts and circumstances and (2) the fact that a
transaction does meet the requirements for specific treatment is not determinative of whether a
transaction or series of transactions of which it is a part has economic substance. A taxpayer
may not escape the economic substance doctrine through labeling an activity as a ‘basic
business transaction’; the facts and circumstances must clearly show that the transaction is in
line with existing authorities.” See Charlene Luke, The Relevance Game: Congress’s Choices for
Economic Substance Gamemakers, 66 TAX LAW 551, 572 (2013).
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However, section 7701(o) may do more than simply solve the
problem prospectively, as its existence seems to be impacting the
development of the judicially created economic substance doctrine.
The Tax Court in Bank of New York Mellon v. Commissioner looked
to the legislative history accompanying section 7701(o) to support
its application of the judicially created economic substance doctrine,
thus harmonizing its pre-section 7701(o) decision with the manner
in which the economic substance doctrine was codified in section
7701(o). 217 Other cases have refused to rule in favor of taxpayers as a
matter of law and are proceeding to trial 218 or are the subject of
interlocutory appeals. 219
These cases in the pre-section 7701(o) era appear to be trending
in favor of the government, and in any event the strongest
arguments in the taxpayer’s favor are arguments that cannot be made
in years that are subject to section 7701(o)’s restrictions. The
government has also been successful in disallowing foreign tax
credits when the U.S. taxpayer is a lender (not a preferred equity
investor) with respect to a structured passive investment
arrangement, demonstrating the effectiveness of the economic
substance doctrine at handling variations in these highly structured
transactions. 220 Given that the generation of objectionable excess
217. See Bank of New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15, 34–35 n.8, n.9 (2013)
supplemented by T.C. Memo. 2013-225 (2013) (Tax Court cites legislative history to I.R.C. §
7701(o) as confirmation of the relevant cases that should be used in applying the judiciallycreated economic substance doctrine).
218. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 2013 WL 6017366 (D. Minn. 2013).
219. See American Int’l Grp., Inc. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2D 2013-1472
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (court stated that the economic substance doctrine’s purpose is “to
determine whether AIG merely sought to minimize its tax burden on otherwise profitable
spread banking activity, or whether the spread between AIG’s cost of borrowing and its return
on investment existed only because of the transactions’ tax consequences including its
negotiated division of its inherent tax benefits”). The district court did allow the case to
proceed on an interlocutory appeal. See American Int’l Group, Inc. v. United States, 112
A.F.T.R.2d 2013-7206 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
220. In Pritired, the taxpayer was disallowed more than $20 million in foreign tax credits
generated in a highly structured transaction involving a $300 million payment to two French
banks. The court ruled against the taxpayer on multiple grounds, finding that the transaction
was a loan rather than an equity investment (thus no I.R.C. §902 credits were available), that
the transaction lacked economic substance, that the transaction violated the partnership antiabuse rules of Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, and that the transaction had no business purpose and no
reasonable expectation of profit. See Pritired 1 LLC v. United States, No. 4:08-cv-00082, 816
F.SUPP. 2D 693 (S.D. Iowa 2011). For a criticism of the Pritired decision, see Jasper
Cummings, Preferred Stock and the Special Purpose Issuer, 135 TAX NOTES 1665 (July
12, 2012).
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foreign tax credits posited by the STARS transactions is adequately
addressed by section 7701(o) in a principled manner, the redundant
application of Regulation section 1.901-2(e)(5) represents needless
complexity that should be removed.
D. U.S. Tax Versus Foreign Tax Permanent Basis Differences and
Section 901(m)
An early means of generating excessive amounts of foreign tax
credits arose in instances where foreign law defined taxable income
in a way that was different from (and broader than) the U.S.
definition of taxable income, thus creating a permanent tax basis
difference between the two jurisdictions. In this situation, foreign
taxes for the full amount were claimed by the U.S. taxpayer even
though a significant portion of the foreign taxes related to items of
income that were excluded from any U.S. taxation. In G.C.M.
26062, 1949-2 C.B. 110, the IRS argued that foreign taxes assessed
on amounts excluded from U.S. taxation should not be eligible for
U.S. foreign tax credit relief because allowing those credits inflated
the amount of foreign tax credits beyond what was required to avoid
international double income taxation and generated inappropriate
cross-crediting. The government felt that international double
income taxation was already avoided if the United States did not
assert taxing jurisdiction over the item that foreign law sought to tax.
Under this view, providing a cross-crediting opportunity for taxes
assessed on excluded income was arguably overly generous.
This argument represented an early effort to prevent inflated
amounts of U.S. foreign tax credit relief. However, this effort to
deny foreign tax credit relief for taxes paid on items that would never
be part of the U.S. tax base was largely rejected by the courts.221
Consequently, after largely failing to convince courts to engage in a
facts and circumstances inquiry to determine whether foreign tax
credit relief was appropriate as a precondition to the grant of such
221. See Helvering v. Nell, 139 F.2d 865, 870−71 (4th Cir. 1944); I.B. Dexter v.
Comm’r, 47 B.T.A. 285, 290−91 (1942), acq., 1948-2 C.B. 1; Brace v. Comm’r, 11 T.C.M.
(CCH) 906, 907, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 52, 265, at 800–01 (1952); United States v. Rexach, 200
F. Supp. 494, 496 (D.P.R. 1961) (considering the argument raised by the Service that the
foreign tax credit is allowed only for items subject to U.S. tax an “extinct question”). But see
Hubbard v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 93 (Ct. Cl. 1936) (ruling in favor of the IRS that
foreign tax credits should not be allowed to the extent assessed on amounts that were not
taxable in the United States).
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relief under section 901, the IRS in 1954 abandoned its arguments
that foreign tax credit relief should only be available when true
international double income taxation was possible with respect to the
underlying item that was assessed a foreign tax. 222 Here things
remained until 2010.
Congress eventually reacted to the cross-crediting opportunities
afforded by tax basis differences with the enactment of section
901(m). 223 In general, section 901(m)(1) denies U.S. foreign tax
credit relief for any foreign taxes attributable to the disqualified
portion of foreign income arising in a covered asset acquisition.
Section 901(m)(2) provides that a covered asset acquisition includes
any transaction that is treated as an asset acquisition for U.S. tax
purposes but is treated as a stock purchase for foreign income tax
purposes. Thus, section 901(m) can apply in instances where (i)
stock in a foreign entity is sold and a section 338 election is made,
(ii) stock in a foreign entity is sold and the foreign entity is
considered a disregarded entity for U.S. tax purposes, or (iii) an
interest in a foreign entity is sold and the foreign entity is treated as a
partnership for U.S. tax purposes. 224 Section 901(m)(3)(a) provides
that the disqualified portion of foreign taxes is the incremental
foreign income tax paid as a result of a permanent tax basis
difference. 225 The purpose of section 901(m) is to deny foreign tax
credit relief for foreign taxes imposed on foreign income that is not
taxable in the United States. This occurs under the theory that
international double income taxation is already avoided due to the

222. The Service formally abandoned this position in Rev. Rul. 54-15, 1954-1 C.B. 129;
see also Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6(a)(1)(iv) (places foreign tax credit for items not subject to U.S.
tax in the general basket, thus accepting their creditability and placing them in the basket that
provides the most protection against the cross-crediting phenomenon).
223. See PUB. L. 111-226, §212 (Aug. 11, 2010).
224. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, “Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of
the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 1586,
Scheduled for Consideration by the House of Representatives on August 10, 2010, JCX-46-10
(Aug. 10, 2010) at 10.
225. I.R.C. § 901(m)(3)(A) achieves this by stating that the disqualified portion means
the ratio of the aggregate percentage basis differences allocable to such taxable year divided by
the income which the foreign tax is applied. I.R.C. § 901(m)(3)(C)(i) provides that the basis
difference means the excess of the adjusted basis of such asset immediately after a covered asset
acquisition over the adjusted basis of such asset immediately before the covered asset
acquisition. I.R.C. § 901(m)(3)(B)(i) provides the general rule that the basis difference will be
allocated to taxable years using the applicable recovery method for U.S income tax purposes.
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nontaxability of the particular item that was subjected to foreign
taxation. The illustration below sets forth the analysis:
Illustration #1. USP purchases the stock of a foreign target (FT)
for $100. FT made substantial use of its assets in its trade or
business. The inside basis in the assets is $40. USP makes a section
338(g) election, thus stepping up the basis of the assets for U.S. tax
purposes. However, no basis step-up exists for local tax purposes as
the transaction is treated as a stock purchase for local tax purposes.
Assume that the additional $60 of basis step-up is amortized over a
15-year period ($4 of additional amortization annually). Assume
that FT has $24 of income (before the additional amortization)
and pays a foreign tax at a 25% tax rate, so on these facts FT pays a
total of $6 of local income tax. Consequently, in this situation, $4
of the $24 of FT’s income will never be subject to U.S. taxation
due to the $4 of additional amortization deductions, and so the
corresponding $1 of foreign tax assessed on this excluded $4 of
income need not be given foreign tax credit relief because double
taxation is already avoided on the $4 of foreign income to which
this $1 of tax relates. Thus, section 901(m) disallows the $1 of
foreign tax that is attributable to the income that is sheltered by
reason of the amortization of the tax basis difference that was
created by reason of the covered asset acquisition. 226

The justification for section 901(m) harkens back to the policy
arguments first expressed in G.C.M. 26062. For U.S. tax purposes,
the assets in Illustration #1 experience a basis step-up in a transaction
where no foreign taxable event occurred. The amortization of this
additional stepped-up basis creates a permanent reduction in the
portion of foreign income that will be taxed in the United States
versus what will be subject to tax in the foreign jurisdiction where no
basis step-up was provided. Thus, in this situation, for U.S. tax
purposes the buyer can obtain a basis step-up in the underlying FT
assets in a transaction where the seller was not subject to a taxable
event in a foreign jurisdiction, creating a permanent basis difference
between the United States and the relevant foreign jurisdiction. The
foreign taxes associated with the excluded income (by reason of the
additional U.S. amortization deduction) are disallowed under
section 901(m) because international double income taxation is
226. For a further analysis of the interplay between I.R.C. § 901(m) and I.R.C. § 338(g),
see Lowell Yoder, Section 338(g) Election for a Foreign Tax Continues to Provide Benefits to
Buyer After New Section 901(m), 40 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 347 (June 10, 2011).
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already avoided with respect to the particular item of income to
which those taxes relate. In the context of this “one-sided taxable
transaction,” it seems appropriate to prevent the buyer from
benefitting from both an asset step-up (that created no tax
consequence to the seller) and also from allowing all U.S. foreign tax
credits. Section 901(m), therefore, arguably prevents a U.S. tax
benefit that is beyond what is necessary to simply prevent double
international income taxation.
However, even though the core theory behind section 901(m)
can be rationalized to achieve an appropriate outcome, the actual
breadth of section 901(m) creates instances where it inappropriately
disallows U.S. foreign tax credit relief. This is particularly true when
the seller in the transaction is a U.S. corporation or a controlled
foreign corporation of a U.S. corporation and a section 338(g)
election has been made. Illustration #2 sets forth the relevant issues:
Illustration #2. The facts are the same as Illustration #1 except
now it is assumed that the seller of FT is a U.S. corporation or a
controlled foreign corporation that is wholly owned by a U.S.
corporation (hereafter, “U.S. Seller”). USP makes a section 338(g)
election. USP and the U.S. Seller report the transaction
consistently as a deemed asset sale for U.S. tax purposes.

In Illustration #2, the U.S. Seller’s tax consequences with respect
to the deemed asset sale will be consistently reported to the United
States government. The United States asserts the right to subject the
U.S. Seller’s income on this deemed asset sale to U.S. net income
taxation 227 with the cross-crediting opportunity limited due to
section 338(h)(16). 228 Given that the United States is a relevant

227. Since § 338(h)(16) treats the gain on the deemed asset sale as a gain arising from a
stock transaction, the gain is passive foreign personal holding company income if earned in the
hands of a controlled foreign corporation, so it will be subject to immediate U.S. taxation even
if the U.S. Seller is a controlled foreign corporation. See § 954(c).
228. Under § 338(h)(16), the seller’s additional § 1248 amount resulting from the
seller’s deemed asset sale arising from a regular § 338(g) election cannot be treated as general
basket foreign-source income but is instead sourced based on the sourcing rules for capital
gain on the sale of the stock which results in this gain either being US-sourced (the result
generally afforded if the U.S. Seller were a U.S. corporation) or passive basket foreign-source
income (the result if the U.S. Seller were a controlled foreign corporation). See § 865(a) and
(f). Either way, cross crediting is prevented either by § 904(a) when the U.S. Seller is a U.S.
corporation or by treating the income as passive basket income per § 904(d)(2) when the U.S.
Seller is a controlled foreign corporation. See Reg. § 1.338-4(h)(8) Ex. 4; see also Kevin Dolan,
Philip Tretiak, & Ronald Dabrowski, U.S. Taxation of International Mergers, Acquisitions, and
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jurisdiction of both the USP and U.S. Seller in Illustration #2, and
because the U.S. tax laws restrict the cross-crediting options with
respect to the U.S. Seller’s taxable gain (via section 338(h)(16)), it is
inappropriate to deny U.S. foreign tax credits to USP by reason of
section 901(m). Viewed from an overall perspective, the basis stepup afforded to USP represents only a timing difference, not a
permanent basis difference, since USP’s basis step-up was created in
a transaction where the U.S. Seller’s gain was subject to U.S. net
income taxation. Thus, the extra amortization deductions afforded
to USP represent only the other side of a transaction where the U.S.
Seller was subject to U.S. net income taxation with respect to its
deemed asset sale.
Section 901(m)(7) grants broad authority to the Treasury
Department to modify the application of section 901(m) to avoid
inappropriate foreign tax credit disallowance results. It states that the
Treasury Department “may issue regulations or other guidance as is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of [section
901(m)], including to provide . . . an exemption for certain covered
asset acquisitions.” 229 The legislative history indicates the
following context:
In cases in which there has been a covered asset acquisition that
involves either (1) both U.S. assets and relevant foreign assets, or
(2) assets in multiple relevant jurisdictions, it is anticipated that the
Secretary may issue regulations clarifying the manner in which any
relevant foreign asset (such as intangible assets that may relate to
more than one jurisdiction) are to be allocated between
those jurisdictions.

Congress recognized that its promulgation of section 901(m)
might be overbroad and potentially provide inappropriate results, so
Joint Ventures at ¶2.03[2][b] (WG&L updated Nov. 2014). For an analysis of how section
338(h)(16) can create results that are harsher when the total earnings and profits in the
controlled foreign corporation exceed the seller’s gain with the consequence that the seller
would be entitled to less deemed paid credits than would otherwise be available if no section
338 election were made, see Lowell D. Yoder, CFC Target: To Make or Not to Make a Code Sec.
338 Election, 3 J. TAX’N OF GLOBAL TRANS. 3 (Winter 2004); Lowell D. Yoder, CCA
200103031: Does §338(h)(16) Apply to Deemed-Paid Credits?, 30 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 443
(Oct. 12, 2001).
229. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of
the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 1586,
Scheduled for Consideration by the House of Representatives on August 10, 2010, JCX-46-10
at 16 (Aug. 10, 2010).
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it was careful to delegate regulatory authority to the Treasury
Department to address any inappropriate application of section
901(m). The Treasury Department should use its delegated
authority under section 901(m)(7) to promulgate regulations to
exempt from section 901(m)’s disallowance rules any stock
transaction between USP and the U.S. Seller that is treated as a
deemed asset acquisition by reason of section 338 where the seller is
a U.S. Seller. In this context, the “relevant foreign jurisdiction” is in
fact the United States because the United States has jurisdiction to
assert taxation over both USP and the U.S. Seller, thus ensuring that
the basis step-up arises in a transaction that affords consistent
treatment toward both the buyer and the seller side of the
transaction in the relevant jurisdiction of each.
The United States has ensured (via section 338(h)(16)) that this
regular section 338(g) election has not afforded an inappropriate
cross-crediting opportunity for the U.S. Seller. Also, the U.S. Seller’s
gain is subject to immediate U.S. taxation. For these two reasons,
the facts set forth in Illustration #2 indicate that the U.S. tax system
does not suffer a distortion from an overall perspective because there
is no “one-sided taxable event.” Said differently, because the United
States is a “relevant jurisdiction” on both the buyer and the seller
side of the transaction and has taken steps to limit the cross-crediting
opportunities afforded to the U.S. Seller, there is no inappropriate
foreign tax credit benefit generated from a US tax policy perspective
in this situation. Consequently, in this context, any “double benefit”
afforded to USP in this Illustration #2 is offset by the fact that the
U.S. Seller must consistently treat this taxable event as a deemed
asset sale for U.S. tax purposes, and is ultimately subject to U.S.
taxing jurisdiction on this transaction. Given this symmetrical
treatment, it seems inappropriate to disallow foreign tax credit relief
in this fact pattern as USP’s basis step-up is simply a timing
difference, not a permanent difference, from the overall U.S. tax
regime’s perspective.
A harder conceptual case exists if the facts are slightly revised
as follows:
Illustration #3. The facts are the same as Illustration #2 except
that no section 338 election is made and FT is treated as a
disregarded entity for U.S. tax purposes. The U.S. Seller sells all
the stock of the disregarded entity to USP.

In this fact pattern, USP again is treated as having purchased the
underlying assets of FT for U.S. tax purposes, and thus USP is
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afforded a stepped-up basis in the underlying FT assets. The U.S.
Seller is subject to this same consistent deemed asset sale
characterization for U.S. tax purposes. Thus, as in Illustration #2,
the United States is a “relevant jurisdiction” that is asserting at least
residual taxing jurisdiction on both the buyer and the seller in this
transaction. However, unlike Illustration #2, now the U.S. Seller’s
taxable gain is not subject to the restrictions of section
338(h)(16). 230 In the context of the facts set forth in Illustration #3,
the U.S. Seller’s gain is likely to be considered low-tax foreignsource general basket income. 231 Thus, U.S. taxation over this
deemed asset gain is preserved only on a residual basis and affords
the U.S. Seller with a potential cross-crediting opportunity (via the
generation of low-tax general basket income that can utilize excess
credits from other transactions). 232
In addition, just as in Illustration #2, USP is likely to generate
excess foreign tax credits as a result of the amortization of the
permanent basis difference. So, Illustration #3 raises the question of
whether section 901(m) is principally bothered about the “one-sided
nature” of a deemed asset acquisition (asset basis step-up to the
buyer without consistent taxable asset sale characterization in the
seller’s relevant taxing jurisdiction) or whether section 901(m) is
concerned about cross-crediting opportunities for USP (via excess
credits generated) in transactions where the U.S. Seller is afforded
generous cross-crediting opportunities with respect to its deemed
asset gain. Comments have been submitted to the Treasury

230. The Treasury Department has recommended that the principles of section
338(h)(16) should be extended to apply to all covered asset acquisitions described in section
901(m). See TREASURY DEPARTMENT, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROVISIONS at 30–31 (Feb. 2016).
231. Because the asset gain relates to assets sold that are used in the active conduct of a
trade or business, the gain is not characterized as foreign personal holding company income
under section 954(c). See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(e)(1)(ii). Furthermore, because assets in
Illustration #1 are assets used in a trade or business (and thus do not give rise to rents and
royalties), the sale of these assets will be exempted from the foreign base company sales rules
regardless of how these assets were originally acquired. See Treas. Reg. § 1.943-3(a). Thus, the
gain, if recognized in a controlled foreign corporation, is not likely to be subject to subpart F
taxation. Finally, because the gain from this transaction is not described in section 954(c), the
gain will all be placed in LuxCo’s general basket. See § 904(d)(2)(A)(i) and (B)(i). For a
further analysis of this planning strategy, see Kevin Dolan, Philip Tretiak, & Ronald
Dabrowski, U.S. Taxation of International Mergers, Acquisitions, and Joint Ventures at
¶2.01[4] (WG&L updated Nov. 2014).
232. See § 904(d)(1).
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Department that posit this situation and indicate that competing
policy claims can be made on whether section 901(m) should apply
in this context. 233 The legislative history is unclear on what the
fundamental policy objective is, and so the Treasury Department
should articulate clearly what the fundamental result is in this
Illustration #3.
III. RECONSTRUCTING SECTION 901 FOR THE POST-WAR ERA
Section 901’s complexity was a result of a legitimate concern.
The foreign tax credit war was a real war. The threats posed by
transactions that artificially generate excess foreign tax credits
represent real policy problems. Since at least 1975, Congress and the
Treasury Department have been convinced that the cross-crediting
phenomenon arising from “objectionable transactions” requires a
response in addition to simple reliance on section 904. Thus, it is
understandable that Congress and the Treasury Department would
seek to redefine the foreign tax credit eligibility standards in response
to transactions where foreign tax credits are generated in
objectionable ways. The dual capacity taxpayer regulations of
Regulation section 1.901-2A, the codified economic substance
doctrine contained in section 7701(o), and section 901(m)’s
disallowance of taxes attributable to permanent tax basis differences
together represent a principled approach to the inappropriate
generation of excess foreign tax credits. These provisions were
needed, and they solved real problems.
However, this is the extent to which positive things can be said.
The historical record indicates that Congress and the Treasury
Department ran roughshod over section 901 and used a scorched
earth approach in their war against objectionable foreign tax credit
transactions. The resulting carnage has caused the U.S. foreign tax
credit regime to become a “byzantine structure of staggering
complexity.” 234 The rush to enact reforms resulted in ill-conceived
regulations. The separate limitation regime of section 907, the
formalistic aspects of the predominant character standard in
Regulation section 1.901-2(b), the selectively applied minimum
holding period requirements of sections 901(k) and (l), and the

233. See New York Bar Association, Report on Section 901(m) at 15–16 (Jan. 28, 2011).
234. See supra note 24.
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noncompulsory payment criteria for structured passive investment
arrangements in Regulation section 1.901-2(e)(5) represent a
plethora of redundant and obsolete complexity. Even worse, because
these redundant, ad hoc provisions were not targeted in scope, they
create incoherent instances of international double income taxation,
even when the underlying transactions are not objectionable.
The occurrence of international double income taxation is an
incoherent outcome when the taxpayer has substantively paid foreign
income taxes in a non-objectionable transaction and yet is denied
U.S. foreign tax credit relief. The United States government
continues to assert worldwide residency-based taxation (either on a
current or deferred basis), and thus must have a coherent foreign tax
credit regime to complement that tax policy orientation given that
our major trading partners have chosen to enact territorial tax
regimes that outright structurally avoid international double income
taxation outcomes. For that reason, the overbroad and redundant
foreign tax credit disallowance provisions should be removed,
especially considering that Congress and the Treasury Department
have enacted more targeted responses that work without the need
for these additional provisions.
With more and more countries adopting territorial tax regimes,
the United States simply must have a principled and coherent foreign
tax credit regime that balances the need to prevent international
double income taxation with the need to prevent the generation of
artificially excessive amounts of foreign tax credits through
objectionable transactions. Objectionable foreign tax credit
transactions that generate excessive and artificial amounts of U.S.
foreign tax credit relief needed principled responses, and principled
responses were enacted in the midst of a scattergun attack on these
objectionable transactions. But, now that these historic issues are
adequately addressed, it is time, in this post-war era, to remove the
ad hoc and redundant bulwarks that were added to section 901 in
the foreign tax credit war. Those provisions create a significant risk of
incoherent outcomes and unjust instances of international double
income taxation. As countries evolve and adapt their tax laws to
protect against the BEPS phenomenon, their adoption of formulary
measures and disallowance rules create the risk of needless and
inappropriate amounts of double international income taxation
under the existing 1983 final regulations. The U.S. foreign tax credit
regime must be overhauled, and now is the time to clean up this
important area of the law so that U.S. multinational enterprises do
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not suffer international double income taxation on income that has
already been subject to foreign income taxes in nonobjectionable situations.
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